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The author discusses frequent practices of rendering the 
name of Bosnia and Herzegovina as ‘Bosnia’ as well as 
the uses of the term ‘Srpska’ in the public discourse. 
Leaving aside the cases of benign mental inertia, 
practices with certain political background are further 
analyzed. They are seen in the context of nationalist 
discourse and development of a ‘central narratives of 
national history’ for three Bosnian nations: Bosniak-
muslims, Croats and Serbs. The paper also sheds light on 
the shifting strategies of the nationalist elites and the 
way those strategies are materialized in the production of 
public discourse on the past. 
 
 








Today’s name for the state of Bosnia and Herzegovina emerged after the 
Berlin Congress awarded the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy with a 
mandate to occupy a part of the Ottoman Empire, in which a peasant’s 
rebellion had been raging for some years.1 The Ottoman authorities 
simply could not find a way to cope with the insurgents – they could not 
accept any of their demands, but they were also not able to militarily 
defeat them and pacify the region. Thus, it was within the framework of 
the realization of the occupational mandate that the name for the country 
was forged and used in the official version in the German language – 
Bosnien und Herzegowina. Seen from one of the possible historical 
perspectives, this fact could have a deeper symbolic meaning. Namely, 
from the period of the Austro-Hungarian occupation and shaping of the 
name from the German version to that of today, in other words, in the last 
century and a half, Bosnia and Herzegovina has functioned largely 
according to the wishes and dictates from outside. The question of 
whether it was to become a ‘land’ (in the sense of a separate 
administration) incorporated into a wider state organism, and the problem 
of how that would be accomplished with greater or lesser autonomy, 
along with the problem of internal organisation, depended on decisions 
made somewhere else – at large international or peace conferences, in 
Vienna and Budapest, or in Belgrade, the capital of the state of which this 
region was part for most of the 20th century, from 1918 to 1991.2 On the 
other hand, in the last 130 years the inhabitants of this region have only 
once had the chance to openly and freely express what they think and 
how they imagine their political future. 
At the beginning of 1992, according to instructions, which, once 
                                                          
1 This is updated and reworked version of the paper published in Croatian as: ʻŠto je 
Bosna bez Hercegovineʼ, Status 8 (2008): 66-84. Translated by Nevenko Bartulin. 
2 The place in which decisions were made about the political future of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina in the period between 1941 and 1945 was not Belgrade, but Zagreb, 
the capital of the Independent State of Croatia (NDH), or, on the other hand, places 
in which the leadership of the Partisan forces under J. B. Tito was located at any 
given moment. 
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again, came from the outside, the inhabitants of Bosnia and Herzegovina 
were supposed to state their positions in a referendum on whether they 
wished to live in an independent state. However, the local political elites 
at the time showed themselves incapable of functioning within the 
framework of a modern democracy – it was not possible to reach a 
consensus on whether a referendum should even be held, let alone reach 
a consensus on what the referendum question should look like. Although 
the referendum was held in the end and the official results were declared, 
twenty-five years later increasingly numerous voices in unofficial 
conversations have questioned the official results. Today one can hear 
stories from the participants of the events of that period about the way in 
which results that were given an official stamp of approval were obtained 
– for example, how ballots were filled out for those who did not vote in 
the referendum, how the real results were forged and so on. A particular 
part of the story surrounding the referendum is linked to the ‘Serbian 
referendum’, held somewhat earlier and organised by the ‘Serbian 
authorities in Bosnia and Herzegovina’ without any controls or 
supervision, in other words without verification of the declared results – 
and sequentially to that fact, the ‘official results’ carried no weight.3 The 
obvious inability of the local political elites to function within the 
framework of a democracy, and even any sort of rules, resulted in the fact 
that today’s Bosnia and Herzegovina has been designed and assembled 
according to the dictate of the ‘international community’. 
The mechanisms of the practical installation of the construct 
                                                          
3 The ability of the state apparatus in Bosnia-Herzegovina to ‘record the conditions’ 
is in any case of a very low level – the census of the population, the first since 
gaining independence (1992) was held in October 2013, but the results have not 
even been published now (March 2015). A particular problem, which is linked to 
the incompetence of the state apparatus, is a deeply entrenched urge amongst the 
country’s subjects to ‘cheat the state’ – as an example I will only cite the words of 
my student who comes from a place in central Bosnia. According to his words, the 
census registered fifteen residents in the house which is located next to his own, but 
the house is practically empty. Those who are counted as its residents are scattered 
and actually live around the world, from neighbouring Croatia to Australia and the 
United States. 
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imposed in Dayton can be clearly discerned upon the basis of academic 
discussions, which are appearing more frequently, such as the argument 
by the American lawyer and professor Monroe E. Price. Price’s thesis is 
more than significant, particularly because of the way in which a typical 
‘international official’ explains the aims of the engagement of the 
‘international community’ in Bosnia-Herzegovina. According to his 
interpretation, which can be considered a representative example of the 
view of ostensibly uninterested and very poorly informed external 
factors, the peace agreement of Dayton and the set of institutions arising 
from it, aimed: “… to reconstitute Bosnia-Hercegovina’s former 
multiethnic nature and create a Bosnian national identity against a 
backdrop of continuing ethnic hatred and loyalties.”4 
Taking into consideration the terminological but also semantic 
differences between the concepts of ‘nation’ (nacija: a ‘people’ with a 
state) and ‘people’ (narod: a community without a state) as is commonly 
used in the Croatian and Serbian linguistic area, on the one hand, and the 
concepts of national identity (state/national identity) and ethnic identity 
(which would be a type of equivalent to Croatian concept of narod) on 
the other, one is nevertheless able to clearly discern the tendency of a 
forced imposition of new solutions and the trampling and quashing of 
traditional values. Not realizing, some would say in a typically American, 
or better still, Anglo-Saxon manner, that such an ‘export of ideologies’ 
actually constitutes the use of rough force, Price and, of course, all other 
similar individuals cannot understand why the ideas which he defends 
encountered resistance in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Perhaps things would 
look much better, and the process of social reconstruction would have 
proceeded much easier, if ‘international factors’ had set as their task the 
option (obviously, without forced imposition of giving the values which 
were dominant in that world a chance).5 
                                                          
4 Price (2002): 144; also see Kaldor (2003) for an example of a similar approach. 
5 Here my conclusions completely match those of Schöpflin (2001): 111, wherein 
the reasons for this accord can be found in the reliance on very similar sources and 
literature. Besides, very convincingly explains the principles upon which the 
‘discursive error’ of Anglo-Saxon analysts and their epigones in the societies of 
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Almost the only actual function of Bosnia-Herzegovina is today 
tied to the necessities of that same ‘international community’ and is 
reduced to disabling a base for militant international (Islamic) terrorism 
on the territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina.6 With the installation of a 
complex political mechanism, which in part takes into consideration, and 
mirrors, the results of military operations from the period between 1991 
and 1995, two important things have been achieved: on the one hand, 
within the Bosnian Muslim political elite, the faction of nationalists has 
been strengthened at the expense of the militant Islamists who were led 
by Alija Izetbegović7 and with whom the international terrorist network 
has, relatively easily, come to an understanding everywhere; on the other 
hand, the Croats and Serbs have been installed in mixed state institutions 
as a controlling mechanism (i.e. a kind of ‘safety fuse’), which has 
disabled the functioning of those institutions as a logistical support base 
for the international terrorist network of Al-Qaida. Here one should recall 
the problems that emerged due to the fact that the authorities in Sarajevo 
had granted the right of Bosnian-Herzegovinian citizenship and passports 
to numerous members of that network between 1992 and 1996. 
                                                                                                                                              
Central and South-Eastern Europe rest, so that a reading of his discussion is very 
useful. 
6 The way in which this base was created after 1991 can now be clearly perceived 
after the publication of Kohlmann (2005). Although Kohlmann does not mention it, 
his conclusions exquisitely coincide with the views of Michael Mann (2003), who 
argues that, in the majority of cases, radical Islamists from Bin Laden’s network 
have infiltrated the areas inhabited by Muslims, where national dissatisfaction 
causes social and political tensions, crises and conflicts. 
7 The role of Bosniak leader Alija Izetbegović in the events from the period 
between 1990 and 2000 also becomes more problematic in the retrospective views 
that come from outside of Bosnia-Herzegovina. This is clearly discussed in 
Kohlmann (2005): 124, 126, 160-61, 204-07, 264-67, even though the author does 
not take into consideration the earlier texts of Izetbegović, such as the ‘Islamic 
Declaration’ – Izetbegović (1990). The positions which Izetbegović takes in this 
text can be seen in a completely different light in view of a deeper insight of his 
practical activities during the 1990s. That ‘someone’ is taking all of this into 
consideration is attested to by the practical activity of representatives of the 
‘international community’, which, for example, has disabled the idea of renaming 
Sarajevo international airport after Alija Izetbegović. 
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However, under the surface of the political system installed by the 
Dayton peace treaty, ideas and political aims which led to the outbreak of 
war in 1991 still persist. These ideas are largely based on the revival, 
reconstruction and, what is very important to stress, the reinterpretation 
of the discourse that characterised the political life of the European 
South-East until 1941. But the elements of the mental landscape 
characteristic for the period of ‘self-managed socialist and non-aligned 
Yugoslavia’ are also almost imperceptibly maintained and reproduced in 
the public discourse.8 All of this has been outlined in order for the reader 
to be able to understand why and how there exist great disagreements in 
today’s Bosnia-Herzegovina, even at the level of debating what name to 
give to the country. Although its official name has remained the same 
since its introduction into use in the period of the Austro-Hungarian 
occupation, this name is rarely used in the public discourse. On the one 
hand, this name is frequently shortened, due to very different reasons, to 
the first part of the official version, so that instead of Bosnia-
Herzegovina, only the term ‘Bosnia’ is used. On the other hand, there has 
appeared a name which never existed until 1992 – Republika Srpska – 
and denotes 49% of territory of the internationally recognised state 
which, according to the last peace treaty, became an autonomous political 
unit within that state. Here I will briefly outline the basis and significance 
of the semi-successful and still not deeply articulated endeavour to ‘push’ 
the new geographical concept – Srpska – into the public discourse, 
evidently conceived as a counterpart to the name of the neighbouring 
country, Croatia. I will also attempt to outline the background to the 
ejection of ‘Herzegovina’ from practical communication and, in 
connection to this, briefly point out the historical foundations upon which 
an old, premodern form of identity, the ‘Herzegovinian’, gains a new 
meaning and, at the same time, how and in what manner this identity is 
used in contemporary political discourse. 
                                                          
8 The methodological models of analysing the ‘communist heritage’ in various 
domains of social life are outlined in the very valuable anthology by Ekiert & 
Hanson (2003). 




‘Strategies of the weak’ 
In a general sense, the shortening of the name of Bosnia and Herzegovina 
into the form of ‘Bosnia’ has a twofold background. On the one hand – 
and ultimately in this I have personal experience – this is the result of a 
benign mental inertia and deeper ignorance of circumstances. Namely, it 
seems to everyone who comes from ‘outside’ that, due to the practical 
necessity of colloquial speech, the name ‘Bosnia’ is a good substitute for 
the longer and ‘impractical’ name ‘Bosnia and Herzegovina’. As a person 
born and raised in Sarajevo, I also followed this practice, which once 
included defining the title of a book of my selected articles in such a 
manner, in collaboration with my publisher in 1999. I had decided, as I 
thought at the time, on a provocative version for marketing – Who Made 
a Mistake in Bosnia – it being understood that ‘Bosnia’ in the title clearly 
referred to Bosnia and Herzegovina.9 Over the years, however, it was 
made known to me, sometimes indirectly, sometimes openly, that I had 
made a big mistake – Bosnia is not the same as Bosnia and Herzegovina. 
In becoming acquainted with the world of Herzegovina and 
Herzegovinians, it became clearer to me that, if things are considered 
from ‘within’ and one is conscious of the importance that seemingly 
small cultural differences have for social relations, there do exist real and 
visible clefts between Bosnia, on the one hand, and Herzegovina on the 
other. This is the result of the differences in the natural and social 
surroundings and the influence of the Mediterranean civilizational circle 
in Herzegovina, the different sedimentation of what could be called 
historical experience, and, actually, a whole series of factors, which 
ultimately do justify the consistent use of the complete name of the 
country, Bosnia and Herzegovina. 
Remaining for a moment on the terrain of personal experience, I 
recall that my father, who had decades of experience of psychiatric work 
at a clinic in Sarajevo, once wrote (sometime at the end of the 1960s or 
the beginning of the 1970s) a short paper on the differences in the 
                                                          
9 See the appendix at the end of the article. 
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psychotic diseases of ‘Bosnians’ and ‘Herzegovinians’. Having observed 
real differences amongst the patients, my father explained them precisely 
in terms of differences in the cultural facies, in other words, to use the 
vocabulary of modern social science, in terms of the existence of 
different ‘social mental mindscapes’.10 Due to a set of circumstances, the 
paper remained in the form of a communique of results and never saw the 
light of day as a finished product. But its reading triggered the due 
attention of Czech and Austrian psychiatrists at a conference in Pula, 
where my father presented his paper, experience he later recalled on 
various occasions. In general, Bosnia and Herzegovina are indeed, at 
least for those that live there, two different socially constructed worlds, in 
the same or similar manner, generally incomprehensible to foreigners, in 
which the Serbian, Croatian and Bosniak Muslim worlds are 
differentiated. From that then arises the conclusion that the ‘practical’ 
condensation of the name of the country is indeed a consequence of a 
benign mental inertia and reveals an ignorance of local conditions. 
On the other hand, however, the shortening of the name of ‘Bosnia 
and Herzegovina’ into the form of ‘Bosnia’ can have, and frequently 
does have, a completely different background and is not simply a means 
of resorting to the practicalities of colloquial speech. In the context of the 
discourse that has been produced in the last decades of the 20th century in 
Sarajevo and which has spread with varying degrees of success to various 
environments, the compression of the official name to the Bosnian 
component has a really strong and clear political background. Namely, 
the public discourse, which was constructed during the 1980s and 1990s 
by the Muslim (until 1993) or (after 1993) Bosniak-Muslim political, 
academic and cultural elite, has the clear characteristics of the last phase 
of the process of constituting a modern nation as a political community. 
Changing the ‘nation’s name’ is a concept that is difficult to 
understand outside of the context of local knowledge built in the former 
                                                          
10 The phrase ‘social mindscapes’, in the book of the same title, is explained in 
detail by Zerubavel (1997). 
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Yugoslavia.11 One should bear in mind that the socialist Yugoslavia 
institutionalised and recognised the national identities that were pre-
existing in 1945 similar to the USSR. After 1945 Yugoslavia copied the 
Soviet constitutional arrangement and the principles of its 
implementation in reality.12 In the 1960s, the existence of a separate 
nation of ‘Muslims’ was gradually recognised (in contrast to ‘muslims’, 
as Islamic believers were called), and from 1968 the new nation was 
‘recognised’ by the state apparatus. For understanding the circumstances 
of the institutionalisation of the new nation it is advisable to start with 
texts written before the outbreak of the ‘War of Yugoslav Succession’.13 
Then it was still possible to write the following sentence: “There simply 
needs to be some skepticism about the credibility of the concepts offered 
by Yugoslav (Muslim) historians.”14 The status of ‘the biggest victims of 
the War of Yugoslav Succession’ simply abolished almost every such 
scepticism in later works. They disqualify, without much regard, the 
works of Croatian and Serbian historians as ‘nationalist myths’, but at the 
same time unconditionally accept the ‘invented histories’ of Bosniak-
Muslims as true statements about the past.15 
The breakdown and disappearance of Yugoslavia created new 
circumstances in which the new state, Bosnia (and Herzegovina) became 
the referential framework for a nation, 90% of whose members live on its 
territory. Thus, the decision to ‘change the name of the nation’ quickly 
matured in the political and intellectual elite, and is actually only one of 
the means of the discursive ‘appropriation’ of the state in which Bosniaks 
still form approximately 45% of the population. The act was formally 
conducted in September 1993 when around 450 ‘distinguished persons’ 
                                                          
11 As defined by Geertz (1983). The way this local knowledge looks in the eyes of 
an outside observer can be well seen in e.g. Lockwood (1975): 20-34; Jansen 
(2005). 
12 Brubaker (1996): 23-54. 
13 E.g. Ramet (1994); Brunner (1994); Höpken (1994); Popović (1994). 
14 Höpken (1994): 216. 
15 E.g. Bieber (2006): 5-28; Donia (2006): 30-59, and many others. See also Dzino 
(2015) in this volume discussing similar problems in contemporary works about 
history of Bosnia-Herzegovina. 
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from Bosnia-Herzegovina, but also the ambassadors of Iran, Turkey and 
USA, gathered in besieged Sarajevo to attend the meeting organized by 
the civil association named ‘The Council of the Congress of Bosniak 
Intellectuals’. The gathered delegates voted in favour of a resolution, 
which changed the national name from ‘Muslim’ to ‘Bosniak’. This 
would not in itself have signified much, but in the specific circumstances 
of the war, as well as the absolute control of the media by the advocates 
of the new ‘national name’, it had a fascinating effect – almost a 
1,500,000 people unconditionally accepted the directive of the national 
‘distinguished persons’ and adopted the new name of the collectivity. 
For a full understanding of this fact, it should be noted that 
Muslims who live outside of Bosnia-Herzegovina and accepted the 
national identification of ‘Muslim’ during the 1960s were not at all 
‘thrilled’ with the new name. In Croatia approximately 50% of Muslims 
accepted the new national denomination, while the other half retained the 
old name of ‘Muslim’.16 In Montenegro, lively discussions amongst 
Muslims and Bosniak-Muslims are ongoing with regard to the question 
of whether the old name is foundational and whether the new name 
should be accepted, while there is no precise statistical data on the 
‘success’ of the new name.17 The way in which the process of changing 
the name in Bosnia-Herzegovina has, through a distortion of the 
sequence of events, been turned into a myth produced by the intellectual 
elite is reflected in the words of the historian Mustafa Imamović, who 
otherwise emphasises, with pride, his role as the author of national 
myths: “in wartime the old historical name – Bosniaks – was 
spontaneously returned in usage by the Bosnian-Muslim people itself.” 
This ‘spontaneous decision of the people’ was formally: “… confirmed 
by the decision of the second Bosniak parliament, held in Sarajevo in the 
fall of 1993. Since then, all Bosnian-Muslim institutions have officially 
taken the Bosniak name.”18 No serious analysis of this ‘change in the 
                                                          
16 Pokos & Hasanbegović (2014). 
17 Dimitrovova (2001). 
18 Imamović (1998): 569. On the author and cited work see Kværne (2003); Ančić 
(2008): 81-93. 
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nation’s name’ exists in the scholarly literature, which only confirms the 
thesis of a lack of scepticism toward ‘stories about ourselves’ that derive 
from the Bosniak milieu. 
One could consider the pamphlet entitled ‘The Bosnian Spirit in 
Literature – What is that’, written by a member of the Academy of 
Sciences and Arts of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Muhamed Filipović, and 
published for the first time in 1967, to represent the programmatic text of 
the construction of that discourse.19 It is in any case worth noting that, 
even in the title of this text, Bosnia and Herzegovina is reduced to its 
Bosnian component, which will remain a permanent feature of the 
discourse of constituting the Muslim or Bosniak-Muslim nation. 
Practicality is not the only reason for this shortening (as it would indeed 
be difficult and impractical to speak of a ‘Bosnian-Herzegovinian 
language’ or a ‘Bosniak-Herzegovinian people’), since it is also directly 
linked to the tenets of the master narrative of Bosniak-Muslim national 
history, as it has been shaped in the last twenty years. The main role in 
the shaping of that narrative has been appropriated by the aforementioned 
author of the pamphlet on the ‘Bosnian Spirit’, Muhamed Filipović. In 
the position of the chief editor of the then Encyclopaedia of Yugoslavia 
for Bosnia-Herzegovina, he was able to explicate in detail on, and 
provide an official stamp to, the ideas exposed in the program of the 
‘Bosnian Spirit’. In the encyclopaedic texts on Bosnia-Herzegovina, in 
which there are many things that are considered generally accepted facts, 
the basic tenets of that program have been embellished by such fictions 
as the existence of the ‘tribe of Bosna’, which settled the area of today’s 
Bosnia-Herzegovina in the early Middle Ages - further enumeration of 
similar fabrications would be pointless. 
The development of the Bosniak-Muslim national discourse and, 
within that, the development of what could be termed the central 
narrative of national history, was conducted until the early 1990s through 
the defensive ‘strategies of the weak’. This in turn meant, in practice, the 
rejection of the more or less aggressive attempts to nationally assimilate 
                                                          
19 Filipović (1967). 
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the Muslim population, and a new Muslim nationalistic discourse 
conceptually leaning on Bosnia would grow out of this rejection and its 
rationale. This discourse acquired a social space as well as more 
substantial momentum from the mid-1970s within the reconstructed 
constitutional-legal framework. From the 1990s onwards this discourse 
gained in aggressiveness, while the political leadership which emerged 
from and was legitimized by this discourse employed the same ‘strategy 
of the weak’ during the entire course of the war.20 
As a brief illustration of the ‘strategies of the weak’, one should 
draw attention to the way the official Muslim political and intellectual 
elite sought, in the late 1960s and early 1970s, to avoid the possibility 
that the newly recognised nation of Muslims be accused of exclusively 
arrogating Bosnia-Herzegovina, whilst nevertheless leaving open the 
possibility of emphasising a ‘special right to Bosnia-Herzegovina’. This 
is wonderfully illustrated in two books by Salim Ćerić, a distinguished 
Communist leader and a member of the inner circle of the ‘creators of the 
new nation’ in the 1960s. The first book, represents a historical-political 
study that explained the changes to the constitution of Bosnia-
Herzegovina, formally adopted in that very year, which entered into its 
                                                          
20 The literature which could be cited here would actually require a whole separate 
publication, so instead I refer the reader to the excellent recent review in which 
Sadkovich (2005) outlines the changes of the political landscape in Bosnia-
Herzegovina during the 20th century, using and citing the most relevant literature. 
From his explanations it is possible to clearly observe the reliance of the Bosniak 
Muslim political and intellectual elite on the ‘strategies of the weak’ during the war 
in Bosnia-Herzegovina, which is clearly recognised and named as such in one of the 
more serious analyses of the war, Gow (2003): 241. The changed social position of 
the Muslims from the 1970s onwards is registered by Banac (1993: 145), in an 
informative discussion, which, however, accepts some very problematic 
interpretations of history by Bosniak-Muslim nationalists including theses such as: 
Islamicization in Bosnia was more massive than in other lands under the Sultan’s 
rule due to the fact that the followers of the ‘Bosnian Church’ more easily 
converted to Islam than the Catholics and Orthodox; ‘Bosniakdom’ in Ottoman 
times as a form of proto-nationalism; the non-participation of Muslims in Ustasha 
crimes; the denial of Izetbegović’s desire to create an ‘Islamic society’ in Bosnia-
Herzegovina. A balanced view from the ‘inside’, by an active participant of all 
these events from the 1940s, is provided in Redžić (2000).  
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provisions the ‘nation of Muslims’.21 The author consistently insists on 
the Muslim and not Bosnian name for the nation, the origins of which he 
traces to the Middle Ages. Neither Ćerić nor all the others who have 
followed him have succeeded in resolving the contradiction between 
these allegedly Bosnian roots and the central significance of the Islamic 
component in the national identity, which, as the conditio sine qua non of 
its very appearance required the destruction of the Kingdom of Bosnia. 
The book concludes with a cryptic prediction about the ‘amalgamation’ 
of various ethnic communities, wherein ‘one wider group, more 
connected than the others’ will finally prevail, while it is; “… the duty of 
progressive Muslims to support such processes … It is not of no 
importance as to which “lepta” will enter into the culture of the future 
and in what volume …”22 The cryptic nature of these words gains in 
clarity, however, if one compares this sentence with what the same 
author wrote later when he more precisely predicted: 
 
“… that the state of Bosnia-Herzegovina will, through 
the logic of its existence, have to help the creation of a 
new, wider Bosnian nationality … This should be done 
carefully, slowly and patiently. Proceed from the 
small, for example, abolish the name of Herzegovina, 
make that ‘harmless’ move, only for the reason of 
practicality, so that the name of the republic is 
shorter; then, downplay the ‘sins’ of the Muslim 
ancestors, downplay their disagreements with Serbs 
and Croats … collect past manifestations of Bosnian 
consciousness, exaggerate their cohesive significance 
… future disputes with the Socialist Republic of Serbia 
and the Socialist Republic of Croatia over material 
and other questions, which certainly exist, will 
automatically separate the Bosnian-Herzegovinian 
Serbs and Croats from their compatriots in the home 
countries … which will practically create a favourable 
                                                          
21 Ćerić (1968). 
22 Ćerić (1968): 246 – lepta is the ancient Greek designation for small change, and 
here it is obviously used as a synonym for ‘value’. 
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climate for the new Bosnian nation.”23 
 
Alongside the indicated happy-end to this process it is clearly stated as to 
who will benefit from this: “so, one fine day, it will come a new Bosnian 
nationality. Only then will the Bosnian-Herzegovinian Muslims definitely 
breathe a sigh of relief.” The message and lesson, clearly recognisable as 
a red thread in today’s Bosniak nationalism in its significantly aggressive 
variant, is clear: in order for the Muslims to breathe a sigh of relief, the 
Croats and Serbs from Bosnia-Herzegovina must cease to be what they 
are and become something else. In such circumstances the then Muslim 
nationalist discourse, which conceptually leaned on Bosnia, was 
constructed through publications with a small reach, intended for the 
intellectual elite. Such is the case with Muhamed Filipović’s foundational 
pamphlet, which was published on the pages of the then fairly obscure 
journal Život. The circle within which that discourse was further 
developed can be sensed from the fact that it was reproduced on the 
pages of publications such as, for example, Prilozi za orijentalnu 
filologiju, which is published by the Oriental Institute in Sarajevo. 
The construction of a nationalist discourse, and within that 
framework, the reinterpretation of history, regardless whether it is a 
question of a defensive or aggressive phase, provokes various reactions, 
in which a wide spectre of views are expressed, from paternalistic 
benevolence to aggressive rejection. But, before any sort of reaction, it 
should be noted that the whole process in the eyes of the Bosniak-
Muslims’ neighbours – first and foremost the Croats and Serbs – can 
acquire the extremely clumsy appearance of turning ‘things known to all’ 
upside down, and alongside this, it is in its spirit completely obsolete and 
anachronistic. This perception, however, is the consequence of 
forgetting, in other words ignoring, the simple fact that the Croatian and 
Serbian national discourses with a central narrative of national history 
were already completely constructed an entire century ago.24 In the 
                                                          
23 Ćerić (1971): 92-99, author’s emphasis – M. A. 
24 It is certainly worth noting the following: the Croatian narrative grew out of the 
historiographical tradition of the 17th and 18th century, above all relying on the 
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meantime, these discourses have, through secondary and, over time, 
primary socialization, become deeply embedded in the collective 
memory, in other words, they have been accepted and interiorized in the 
individual consciousness and have in this way become something that is 
‘known to all’. However, the very process of construction flowed more or 
less in the same manner as it is unfolding today amongst the Bosniak-
Muslims; it thus provoked similar reactions and opposition amongst 
neighbouring peoples in the same way that that process today provokes 
Croats and Serbs. 
The atmosphere of constructing the main narrative of national 
history (in which the above stated positions played a key role) is reliably 
outlined in the case of the debate surrounding the text known under the 
name Pacta conventa. In the midst of bitter debates, conducted at the end 
of the 19th and beginning of the 20th century between Croatian and 
Hungarian historians over the credibility and interpretation of 
information presented in that text, Iso Kršnjavi attempted to write about 
it in a manner which was at odds with the heated tone and black-and-
white positions of historical-political debates. Through a sober 
historiographical process, Kršnjavi attempted to discern the 
circumstances of the emergence and realistic background of that text, 
arriving at results that did not satisfy either Croatian or Hungarian 
political-historical ambitions. Consequently, the editorial staff of the 
Zagreb newspaper Obzor (the main platform of the discourse on the 
Croatian side) requested from Kršnjavi “a statement as to whether he 
accepts the Hungarian or Croatian viewpoint.” The true nature and real 
background of the whole debate is revealed in the fact that the heated 
debates between Croatian and Hungarian historians over the Pacta 
conventa were simply extinguished by the dissolution of the state-legal 
union of Croatia and Hungary in 1918. The question as to what the text 
known under the name Pacta conventa really represents again became 
                                                                                                                                              
works of Ivan Lucius-Lučić (Kurelac [1994]) and Pavao Ritter Vitezović (Blažević 
[2002]), while the Serbian narrative emerged in the 19th century almost ex nihilo – 
Ančić (2008): 190-92. 
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current in the 1960s, but only within Croatian historiography, and 
occurring after the beginning of a principally healthy process of 
demythologising Croatian national history.25 
Besides this, one should bear in mind that the construction of a 
national discourse with a central narrative of national history is a key step 
in the construction of ‘the nation as an imagined community’. This 
narrative complex, which some authors term a ‘national myth’, has a 
decisively important role in the life of an ‘imagined community’ because, 
as G. Schöpflin explains, it becomes: 
a) an instrument of self-identification, since the acceptance of basic 
tenets secures membership in the community (in this way the borders of 
the community are established) 
b) an instrument of the transfer of identity (from an imagined collectivity 
to a real individual and back) 
c) an instrument of communication that simplifies ideas and enables the 
arrangement (construction) of the social world of the community 
d) a way of restricting the cognitive field and thus reducing complex 
realities to simpler forms, which thereby become accessible to the wider 
public and enable a collective reaction.26 
In the light of the aforementioned facts, the shortening of the name 
of ‘Bosnia and Herzegovina’ to the form ‘Bosnia’ points to the first 
initial steps in the reduction of complex realities to simpler and more 
easily understood forms. However, if one compares such a process with 
the practice found amongst Bosnia-Herzegovina’s immediate neighbours 
certain differences will become apparent. Namely, the term ‘Croatia’, as 
the overall name for the regions in which Croats live, subsumes the 
historical heritage of regional peculiarities and, in a certain way, ‘covers’ 
the toponymes: Dalmatia, Slavonia, Istria, Lika and even Herzeg-Bosnia 
(Herceg-Bosna). In recent times, since the beginning of the 1990s, the 
                                                          
25 The whole debate surrounding the Pacta conventa is amply shown in Antoljak 
(1980): 12, 18. 
26 All of these functions of the ‘national myth’, or, what appears to me a better term, 
the central narrative of national history, is analysed in detail by Schöpflin (1997): 
22. 
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attempt has been made to install Herzeg-Bosnia in the public discourse as 
a regional term of reference for the parts of Bosnia and Herzegovina 
which are inhabited by Croats; one should point out that this process has 
had much more success in Bosnia-Herzegovina than in Croatia. 
The name ‘Croatia’ transforms the regional names into second-
class terms, and as part of a larger entity, which is reified through the 
agency of contemporary state institutions, so that it is eagerly used, in 
particular, in the circles of old-school nationalists – the so-called ‘state-
builders’. However, in the discourse of professional academic 
historiography, especially with regard to research on the premodern 
period, the historical provinces remain a clear framework, so that almost 
no one will say ‘southern Croatia’ instead of ‘Dalmatia’, while the 
imagined entity of the national territory is usually referred to as the 
‘Croatian lands’. 
 
The discourse on Republika Srpska 
A certain similarity, which appear to make it more similar to the 
Bosnian/Bosniak case, can be observed in the Serbian national discourse. 
The spatial dispersion of members of the modern Serbian nation seems to 
be a great problem within the national/nationalistic discourse – namely, if 
today’s Serbs are inhabitants of historical lands which, according to their 
terminology, are clearly not Serbian, then there does appear to be a great 
problem with regard to the need to explain how that very same Serbian 
nationalism can claim territories where today’s Serbs live, even though 
they did not live there ‘in times past’. The problem is even more acute 
and bigger because the Serbian nationalist discourse is centred in 
Belgrade and from there it makes aggressive claims on certain regions 
precisely on the basis of ‘historical rights’ on the basis of the fact that 
‘Serbs once lived there’ and that those regions ‘were once Serbian lands’, 
although today the Serbian population represents a noticeable minority in 
these areas. The first is Kosovo, which is regularly called ‘Kosovo and 
Metohija’ (metohija=Serb. church property) in Serbian public discourse, 
and Macedonia which until recently was, and in some circles is, known 
as ‘Old Serbia’. 
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Here it is necessary to interrupt the thread of the narrative on 
Bosniak Bosnia and its relationship to Bosnia and Herzegovina and 
highlight the innovation which is represented by the introduction of the 
geographical term Srpska (‘Serbian’) in the social discourse, above all 
through the media of mass communication. One should note that it would 
be difficult to imagine how this process could be the result of an 
elaborated strategy organised in a national/nationalistic central location. 
It seems to be more a case of an intuitive process, which fits into a 
coherent whole produced by the nationalist discourse. This discourse was 
equally reconstructed through an (archaic) academic and journalistic 
production which came out of Belgrade, Banja Luka and Pale, by the 
‘political testament’ which was presented in vivo to viewers by Slobodan 
Milošević in The Hague, and the practical agency of local political 
factors. In order to understand this complex, however, a key fact which 
has so far been hidden from the wider public eye, and which refers to 
changes in international norms in relation to the disintegration of the 
world communist movement and Yugoslavia in the late 1980s and 1990s, 
needs to be taken into consideration. 
In short, in the case of the former Yugoslavia the previously valid 
system of international norms linked to the question of minority rights, 
according to which the principle of maintaining established state borders 
transcended the principle of self-determination, was abandoned. This, in 
turn, means that the right to self-determination could not be utilized in 
those cases where its realization would threaten existing state borders. 
The case of Yugoslavia was, however, specific in that its internal 
administrative borders corresponded to a large degree with the ethnic 
composition of the population, and in that way national federal units 
were created which acquired the characteristics of real statehood in the 
‘internal’ Yugoslav discourse after 1974. When two of these units 
(Slovenia and Croatia) asked to exercise the right to self-determination in 
1991, the international community undertook a policy which surprised 
and angered, with at least some justification in relation to the established 
system of norms, a part of the administrative structures of Yugoslavia in 
Belgrade. The verdict of the well-known ‘Badinter commission’ 
Croatian Studies Review 11 (2015) 
31 
 
established a new principle – the right to utilize self-determination for 
‘nations which live in a region that is a defined territory with an already 
existing right of autonomy’. This change was very quickly observed by 
both theoreticians of international relations and East European 
politicians; for example, this was the basis for the change in the discourse 
of representatives of the Hungarian minority in Romania, which started 
to demand territorial autonomy. The commission’s verdict, however, 
outlined the procedure whereby the right to self-determination could be 
realized, but the basic prerequisite for this, as already mentioned, was the 
existence of a compact territory with a specific degree of autonomy in 
relation to the rest of the state.27 
In light of the above, the legal constituting of the Republika Srpska 
                                                          
27 For more on this see the paper by M. Rady (1993), written and published quite 
some time ago. The changes that have developed in political theory at the end of the 
20th century are examined in the interestingly conceived book, together with a series 
of authors mainly from central Europe – Kymlicka & Opalski (2001). Kymlicka 
restricts himself to a small number of facts and schematically outlines cases which 
he uses as an example and frequently neglects details, which, however, change the 
meaning of the whole case that is being examined. A good example is the manner in 
which he outlines the Serb rebellion in Croatia – Kymlicka (2001): 63. So his 
research shows itself to be a complete failure in comparison with the detailed 
reconstructions and studies such as Barić (2005), and Gow (2003). 
The problems which result from such a methodological process are brought to light 
in the case of the discussion unfolded on the pages of the Sarajevo journal Prilozi 
Instituta za istoriju u Sarajevu in relation to an article by one of the authors in 
Kymlicka’s collection, Pål Kolstø. Kolstø, a distinguished expert for ethnic 
relations in Eastern Europe and a professor at the University in Oslo, published his 
discussion on the use of flags in the new states of Eastern Europe in Prilozi in 2004, 
examining the case of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Mesud Šadinlija responded in the 
journal’s following issue, while Kolstø answered him in the same issue. Accepting 
some of the remarks made by Šadinlija, Kolstø (2005: 85) acknowledged that the 
information he drew on for his article came from the Internet. It would certainly be 
interesting to see how such a distinguished scholar would respond if someone wrote 
an academic discussion on Norwegian issues by using information collected from 
tourist guides or internet websites of extremely questionable credibility. Certainly, 
the biggest problem here is the fact that the results of analyses acquired through 
such an non-academic process frequently become the basis for the practical 
functioning of the ‘international community’, so that it is no wonder that the effect 
of such actions is, as a rule, opposite to what is expected. 
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through the peace agreement contracted in November 1995 in Dayton 
acquires a completely new significance. It is doubtful that the changes to 
the system of international norms could have escaped the political and 
academic elite in Belgrade. Namely, the influence of these changes can 
be clearly seen in the fact that the Republika Srpska was constituted as a 
‘compact territory with a high degree of autonomy’ in relation to the state 
of Bosnia and Herzegovina, so that one could conclude that it is 
completely equipped for the process of secession from that state.28 
Through ethnic cleansing29 and the migration of Serbs from Croatia, the 
prerequisites have been created for the eventual future referendum on 
independence to be voted in the affirmative with an absolute majority. 
The representatives of the international community, who have aided 
through their inaction the authorities of Republika Srpska in the 
prevention of the mass return of refugees, have also contributed 
unintentionally or deliberately to the complete success of the future 
eventual referendum. This process, however, will not be initiated until 
the USA has an interest in keeping the Serbs within the framework of 
Bosnia-Herzegovina for the sake of controlling the Islamic radical 
element. It is precisely this point that shows the importance of the 
aforementioned nationalistic discourse, within which the geographical 
and political term ‘Srpska’ has been introduced and implanted. 
The basis of this discourse is in large part formed by the production 
of academic historiography, with its origins, in the first instance, in 
Belgrade, which I will deal with in more detail here. This production is 
illustrated, for example, by the published doctoral and MA theses by 
                                                          
28 This is precisely the proper context of the pronouncement by Dobrica Ćosić, 
according to which the provisions of the Dayton peace treaty: “establish for the first 
time in modern history the basis of a Serbian state beyond the Drina” – cited 
according to Barić (2005): 525. 
29 It is completely mistaken to speak of ‘genocide’ in this case – see the accurate 
analysis by Mann (2005), which, while not denying the indisputable fact that ethnic 
cleansing is a crime, considers, and convincingly demonstrates, that it is also an 
unavoidable and attendant phenomenon of the construction of the ‘liberal-
democratic national state’. 
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Siniša Mišić and Jelena Mrgić-Radojčić.30 The subject of the book by 
Mrgić-Radojčić is the medieval history of the Lower Regions (Donji 
Kraji), the western part of today’s Bosnia and Herzegovina in the upper 
and middle river basins of the Vrbas and Sana. The book is actually a 
MA thesis submitted at the Faculty of Philosophy of Belgrade University, 
which, along with the book (doctoral dissertation) by Mišić, shares an 
underlying intention – to prove that Serbs have ‘always’ lived in the 
regions which are being studied. Within the framework of the 
imaginative constructs of these authors, ‘always’ means from the times of 
the Slavic migrations of the 7th century. Furthermore, both works have 
the semblance of serious academic literature – they are furnished with a 
scholarly apparatus in the form of footnotes based on primary and 
secondary sources from which the authors derive facts, and they 
pretentiously wish to be ranked in the genre of historiographical-
geographical studies. But, similarly to Mišić, who is in that sense more 
explicit and who is invoked by Mrgić-Radojčić as a model, the latter 
actually has only one aim, and that is: to prove the original Serbian 
character of the regions which form the subject of her analysis. This aim 
is reached with a relatively simple technique of arranging already 
established pictures of the past from existing historiographical works, on 
the one hand, and suppressing everything that is contrary to her fixed 
theses, on the other.  
The initial phase implies the restriction of the discourse’s range of 
knowledge to the freely imagined ‘Serbian lands’, as is done by Mišić, 
and as is clarified by Mrgić-Radojčić in her ‘Introductory reflections’: 
 
“the comparative research of the medieval history of 
Serbia and Bosnia has been shown to be exceptionally 
productive and methodologically completely accurate, 
since both states sprang from a common foundation – 
one of the oldest Serbian states which was named 
Baptized Serbia by Constantine Porphyrogenitus.”31 
                                                          
30 See more about the book by Mišić in Ančić (2001): 143-46. 
31 Mrgić-Radojčić (2002): 22-23. For more on the same process in Mišić’s work, 
see Ančić (2001): 143. 
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There can actually be no serious commentary on such views because to 
prove the existence of such a Serbia from the time of the migration of 
Serbs requires something more than the very imprecise statements (in 
time and space) removed from the work De Administrando Imperio 
(DAI) created only in the middle of the 10th century – the very fact that 
the work speaks of events which took place three centuries earlier is 
enough to provoke skepticism –  and the powerful desire of Serbian 
historians to trust their own interpretations of those statements. Along 
with such reflections there remains only space for derisive views and a 
great number of questions such as: how many ‘Serbian states’ were there 
if ‘Baptised Serbia’ was ‘one of the oldest’. Anyone with a remote 
knowledge of the Middle Ages would have written ‘baptised Serbia’ – it 
is an adjective with which the anonymous Byzantine author from the first 
half of the 10th century explains the difference between two Serbian 
states which he himself has named as such. If it already existed, was this 
state a ‘national state’ including subjects with a uniform identity, in other 
words why did the Serbs create various states out of the framework of 
such an imagined political community, but only one of those states was 
named ‘Serbia’? How many Serbs were there if they created numerous 
states? What would the migration of hundreds of thousands of people in 
the 7th century, as implied by these and similar views, have resembled – 
who organised and led it, and in what manner, how did they traverse the 
huge wide expanses that separate the region of ‘unbaptised White 
Serbia’, far to the north, and ‘baptised Serbia’, wherever it was located in 
the region of contemporary Serbia and Bosnia-Herzegovina? What did 
the ‘springing forth from the common foundation’ look like and what sort 
of relations existed between the various Serbian states in various periods? 
And finally when, how and why did ‘baptised Serbia’ crumble, into 
which parts, and what did that ‘state’ in general look like, a state about 
which sources until the mid-10th century do not say anything? 
The problems, however, with demonstrating the historical roots of 
Serbdom in these areas already begin in Mrgić-Radojčić’s case at the 
level of geographical terminology. It is not clear to her, or at the least she 
cannot accept, that the medieval term, the Donji Kraji (‘Lower Regions’), 
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actually has no connection with the contemporary term Bosanska Krajina 
(‘Bosnian Frontier’). The transformation of geographical terms has, 
however, a deep and important causal-effect connection with changes in 
the composition of the population in this region from the 16th century 
onward.32 Therefore, she has made an etymological error in equating the 
term Kraji – in the sense of the contemporary term krajevi (commonly 
translated as partes in medieval Latin, in this case partes inferiores) – 
with the term Krajina, in the sense of a frontier region. In Latin that 
would be confines or limes; it is significant that the well-known 
‘Krajinas’ from the Middle Ages were not translated into Latin, but 
rather the term was retained as a geographical term, while only the 
military organization of frontier regions that originated in the early 
modern era was translated into German as Militärgrenze. The 
contemporary term ‘Bosanska Krajina’ can be traced to the period of 
Habsburg-Ottoman wars, when the term became deeply rooted as 
signifying a military organization on the frontier of the Bosnian pashaluk 
(paşalık) on the Ottoman side in contrast to the Habsburg ‘Military 
Frontier (Krajina)’.33 The narrative about Kraji and Krajinas is, however, 
necessary in order for the author to be able to affirm that “several 
krajinas are well-known in the Serbian medieval states”,34 amongst them 
                                                          
32 This was reliably discussed and written about long ago, with excellent knowledge 
of relevant Ottoman sources, by the Serbian historian Milan Vasić, cited by Mrgić-
Radojčić. Among other things, Vasić (1962: 234) established that the geographical 
term, ‘Bosanska Krajina’, appears for the first time at the end of the 16th century in 
an entry from 1593 linked to the Orthodox Church, the organization and hierarchy 
of which began to spread into these areas with the arrival of a new population. 
33 A picture of the frontier world has, in the most recent times, begun to be sketched 
in completely new colours, see Roksandić (1998); (2003) and Roksandić & 
Štefanec (2000). 
34 Mrgić-Radojčić (2002): 27. The Krajinas of Serbian historical narratives, which 
easily omit centuries and huge spaces, are the direct conceptual basis for the 
‘Republic of Serbian Krajina’ (as a part of the territory of the Republic of Croatia 
under the occupation of rebel forces in the first half of the 1990s was known). The 
term ‘Krajina’ is, however, far from being exclusively tied to the ‘Serbian medieval 
states’, as one might conclude from the manner in which the author has written 
about the subject. It is enough to point out the term is mentioned on the well-known 
Baška Tablet, a monument written in the 12th century in the Croatian language and 
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the Krajina on the littoral between the River Neretva and Vrulje, which is 
nothing more and nothing less than the “frontier province of the 
Nemanjić state facing the Hungarian Kingdom.”35 This sequence of 
deducting conclusions, as well as the choice of comparable cases, 
confirms and establishes, on the one hand, that which has already been 
discussed – namely, her paragon Siniša Mišić already wrote in the same 
manner, while, on the other hand, it creates a space for conquering 
historical Serbian areas. Entangled in constructs of the narrative of the 
‘school’ from which she has sprung forth, the author evidently is not 
capable of asking herself whether that region was a Krajina before the 
Nemanjić state, which it ruled this region relatively briefly in the first 
half of the thirteenth century and before the Hungarian ruler Coloman 
became King of Croatia through the coronation in Biograd in 1102. 
The consequence of the trend directed toward the unprovable 
demonstration of Serbdom is the lack of time and space for consideration 
of realistic historical problems, so that ordinary nonsense and absurd 
assertions appear in such texts. Thus, it seems to Mrgić-Radojčić that the 
‘epithet Lower (in the term Lower Regions) illustrates the height above 
sea level of this province’,36 which, and everyone can be persuaded of 
this by looking at a physical map of Bosnia-Herzegovina, is distinctly 
mountainous – should one even waste words on introducing the concept 
of ‘height above sea level’ into the mental frameworks of the Middle 
Ages. Her paragon, on the other hand, arrived at the following wisdom in 
his scholarly treatment of the subject: the advantage of the life of 
medieval people in the area of the land of Hum was found in the warm 
climate with hot summers and mild winters, which suited them more than 
the continental climate, above all because they had no need for warmer 
clothing and heating of the space in which they lived’.37 A real example 
                                                                                                                                              
Glagolitic script and originating on the island of Krk. On this tablet the term Krajina 
defines the “frontier province (of the Croatian Kingdom) facing Germany” – 
Barada (1952): 13-16. 
35 Mrgić-Radojčić (2002): 28. 
36 Mrgić-Radojčić (2002): 28. 
37 Mišić (1994): 241. 
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of the inappropriate nationalistic discourse is, however, represented by 
Mrgić-Radojčić’s claim that, in the aforementioned mid-10th century DAI 
Bosnia was designated by the term ‘little land’ (horion in Greek) in order 
to “designate the size of the territory of Bosnia in relation to size of the 
whole of Serbia, by which it was surrounded on all sides.”38 That Mrgić-
Radojčić actually speaks, and is probably not aware of doing so, only and 
exclusively about the times of the present day and that she only wraps the 
discourse in historical garb, is best seen when she considers the 
individual districts of the Lower Regions. She thus includes three 
counties which never belonged to the Lower Regions – Vrbas, Sana and 
Dubica.39 These three counties were, amongst other things, encompassed 
by a network of church parishes of the Bishopric of Zagreb, which is a 
reliable sign that they never belonged to either the Lower Regions or 
(especially) medieval Bosnia, but such an explanation would demolish 
the enchanting simplicity of the assertion that all regions in which Serbs 
live today were ‘Serb from the beginning’. Besides, the population of 
these regions, at least as can be established today, spoke the ikavian 
dialect, so that one of the medieval towns in these regions was not called 
Levač, but Livač, while the fact that it “survived the fall of the Bosnian 
state in 1463” does not signify anything because it was never a part of 
medieval Bosnia.40 But medieval Bosnia is invoked here because it 
represents the already conquered part of the ‘historical Serbian lands’, so 
that the placement of some region within its borders automatically 
transforms it into a ‘historical Serbian land’. Medieval Bosnia was, 
according to the opinion of Serbian historians, definitively conquered 
                                                          
38 Mrgić-Radojčić (2002): 29. It would certainly be very interesting and instructive 
to extrapolate from these reflections the theoretical starting point of the author in 
regard to the relationship of the whole (Serbia) and one of its parts (the little land of 
Bosnia), as she sees it. It would also be instructive to illuminate the transfer of the 
conceptual matrix of a contemporary nationalist/historian onto the author who lived 
in the first half of the 10th century. This is a question of a process which is far from 
being limited only to Serbian historiography. 
39 Mrgić-Radojčić (2002): 244-62. 
40 Mrgić-Radojčić (2002): 252. It would, again, be very interesting to theoretically 
examine what the assertion of the town ‘surviving’ the fall of the state means. 
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‘academically’ in recent times by the academic Sima Ćirković; the idea 
of Bosnia surrounded by baptised Serbia derives from his analyses and 
discourses.41 But not even Ćirković spoke of a complete encirclement 
because, by citing that which could be found in DAI as support for his 
views, and thus giving those quotations the weight of complete authority, 
he had to take into consideration what had been written about Croatian 
counties on the border with Bosnia in the same text. And it is precisely 
here where Mrgić-Radojčić makes a real breakthrough and leads the 
‘Serbian national cause’ a step further with a very simple but, in the eyes 
of an informed reader, ignorant and awkward process. Namely, in her 
reflections on individual counties, the author always starts with the oldest 
references in the sources, refraining from that principle only in the case 
of the county of Pliva, in other words, precisely the one which the text 
from the 10th century places in medieval Croatia.42 
Instead of a further analysis of the other more or less similar 
methodological procedures, which rely upon the traditional matrix of 
modern Serbian historiography,43 and which render the text by Mrgić-
Radojčić a classic work within the framework of that tradition identical 
in spirit to the work of Mišić, I would suggest there is a general rule 
which can be derived from all of this. Namely, it is worth noting that the 
                                                          
41 Ćirković (1998). It would be going too far to go into a more detailed discussion 
of the way in which the author treats facts derived from the work originating in the 
mid-10th century and brings them into a sort of connection with facts and relations 
from the 14th and 15th centuries (of which he otherwise has an excellent 
knowledge). It is only worth stating that citations from DAI are treated in such a 
way as if its anonymous author was really excellently acquainted with and 
masterfully governed facts which outline the contemporary political landscape of 
the deep hinterland of the eastern Adriatic coast in his time, which is in complete 
contrast with the results of serious discussions. On the other hand, one can clearly 
discern the conquering of historical spaces in his argument as a reflex of the current 
environment, which is, for example, clearly reflected when the author speaks of 
Bosnia-Herzegovina, which then functioned as a separate state to a large degree as 
the “former Yugoslav republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina” – Ćirković (1998): 31. 
42 Mrgić-Radojčić (2002): 193. 
43 For more on the social circumstances of the emergence of this historiography and 
the shaping of its tradition under the wing of Serbian nationalism, see Ančić (2008): 
190-92. 
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appetite of some Serbian historians for the original historical territory 
increases parallel to the distance of those authors from the discourse that 
prevails in the contemporary world. Thus, Stevan K. Pavlowitch, an 
historian who lives and works in England, which subsequently makes it 
hard where to place him in Serbian historiography, laconically asserts 
that the Serbian name “spread to those (Slavs) who set themselves up in 
the valleys and basins south of the Danube, between the rivers Bosna and 
Ibar.”44 In fact, Pavlowitch, and this should be particularly noted, does 
not assert that the Serbs settled this wide area compactly, but rather that 
their name extended to the population of these regions, which is 
completely in line with contemporary knowledge of early medieval 
ethnic communities. Nevertheless, being nearer to the tradition of local 
discourse, Sima Ćirković cannot restrain himself from considerably 
expanding the area of settlement of the Serbs, so that he vaguely speaks – 
in a book intended for the world market and originally published by 
Blackwell – of a “Serbian tribe in the karst basins suitable for 
agriculture between the Dinaric Alps and the Adriatic coast”, but on an 
enclosed map he extends his ‘Baptised Serbia’ to the Vrbas and Cetina 
Rivers, as well as to the Sava in the north and the Adriatic in the south, 
forced to recognize the fact that his favourite (and selectively used) 
authority, the work DAI, expressly places the counties Pliva, Livno and 
Imota (Imotski) in Croatia.45 
It is worth observing the following – Ćirković knows that his book 
will be reviewed and that this will be done by someone with a minimum 
of necessary knowledge, so that he shows a kind of self-control and lets 
his imagination run wild only in those places where the preserved sources 
do not directly contradict his assertions. In a book with only local reach 
and intended for a domestic audience, which needs to once again be 
convinced that the regions in which Serbs have ‘always’ lived were 
‘theirs’, there is nothing standing in way of preventing Mrgić-Radojčić 
from arbitrarily imagining history. The conceptual basis of her 
                                                          
44 Pavlowitch (2002): 1. 
45 Ćirković (2004): 10-13. 
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undertaking can be more or less outlined as the following: who amongst 
Serbs would dare to respond negatively to the author’s achievement in 
the historical conquest of areas for those same Serbs, and, in any case, if 
somebody else responds then it is not important because that will be 
automatically denounced as an ‘anti-Serbian intrigue’ and part of a wider 
anti-Serbian conspiracy. 
Therefore, by being part of such a discourse, which corresponds 
with almost nothing in modern historiography, authors such as Ćirković 
and Mrgić-Radojčić, but also the entire school of thought which is 
persistently reproduced through their activity, have more of a 
resemblance to a classic nationalist, as described by Anthony Smith, than 
to a professional historian.46 Comparing the nationalist to an 
archaeologist, Smith concludes that he or she “places the [one should not 
forget: imagined – M. A.] community in its historical time and in that 
way creates the symbolic and cognitive foundation for that community.”47 
The definition of the temporal and spatial framework of the community 
gains weight, however, if one takes into consideration very specific 
circumstances – the part of Serbian historiography in question probably 
operates in this manner instinctively and within the habitus of ‘national 
activism’, which defines a whole ‘social and mental landscape’. I use the 
term habitus in the sense of Pierre Bourdieu’s definition, according to 
which it is (in somewhat simplified terms) a self-regulated framework of 
deeply embedded predispositions in the human mind that enable, on the 
one hand, the valorization and interiorization of experiences, and, on the 
other, the regulated improvisation of agency in line with the demands of 
objective possibilities of that agency.48 The mass reproduction of a partly 
                                                          
46 Here one should point to one example which possibly outlines the way in which 
these authors experience themselves. In a book in which he published two 
‘conversations’ with another well-known Serbian historian/nationalist, Vasilije 
Krestić, Miloš Jevtić called his collocutor a ‘national activist’, which Krestić, who 
otherwise claims that he is not a nationalist, simply accepts – see Jevtić (2001): 138 
for his rejection of the term ‘nationalist’, and 201, for his acceptance of the 
formulation, ‘national activist’. 
47 Smith (1999): 176. 
48 Bourdieu (1977): 78. 
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standardized habitus, through the process of secondary socialization and 
education, creates ‘mental social landscapes’ within specific social 
groups which then determine the possibilities and scope of individual 
perceptions and the elaboration of collected information.49 In such a 
context it is possible to presume that, for example, Mičić and Mrgić-
Radojčić ‘did not see’ at all, in other words they unconsciously ignored 
or regarded as unimportant information that contradicted their 
‘discoveries’ and views, which were deduced from these ‘discoveries’. 
At the same time, however, this occurs in the expectation of the moment 
in which it will be possible to achieve the aim of separating the 
Republika Srpska from Bosnia-Herzegovina. It is not difficult to foresee 
that, in the imagination of ‘national activists’, this moment will then open 
the grand finale of national history, the revival of the ‘golden age’ 
through the reconstruction of the original community and a return to 
(imagined) roots. 
For all that, on the level of a conscious articulation of views, which 
will presumably be accepted in the wider environment, Ćirković thinks 
that:  
 
“There is no ‘struggle for liberation and unification’ 
awaiting the divided parts of the Serb people. Their 
objective is to renew severed ties with their neighbors, 
the European and international community, and 
restore the capacity to welcome what the modern 
world has to offer for the good and progress of 
humankind.”50 
 
To what degree this is contrary to Ćirković’s actual behaviour and 
discourse intended for domestic use can be discerned from his practical 
conduct, which includes the following: the signature on a 1991 petition 
for the suspension of the bombardment of Dubrovnik. However, he did 
not sign petition against the bombardment of other Croatian towns, 
                                                          
49 For more on the way ‘mental and social landscapes’ define social groups see the 
discussion by Zerubavel (1997): 49. 
50 Ćirković (2004): 296. 
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because Dubrovnik ‘is important for Serbs and for Croats’, while the 
remaining towns are important, perhaps, only for Croats; the expression 
‘the former Yugoslav Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina’ in the text 
from 1998; and finally, the production, through this entire period, of 
historians such as Mišić and Mrgić-Radojčić who both proudly stress the 
contribution of Ćirković to the forming of their scholarly careers, and in 
both cases he was indeed a member of the committee before which they 
defended their works, while afterwards he was a reviewer of their books. 
These actions remain to be judged by the author himself.51 
The path from such ‘knowledge’, which creates the academic 
‘national activist’, to the public discourse is too complex to be explained 
in detail here, so that it is enough to note that this ‘knowledge’ is the 
actual basis, or the ‘symbolic and cognitive foundation’, of this 
discourse. This practically means that – mediated and simplified through 
the diligence of publicists, journalists, writers of textbooks and teachers 
and professors of history in primary and secondary schools – for the 
media audience that is much larger than readers of masters’ and doctoral 
theses – this ‘knowledge’ is included in the notion of the Republika 
Srpska as an original and ‘centuries-old Serbian land’. This ensures, at 
first glance, the incomprehensible and appalling, massive acceptance and 
adoption of a geographical term that appeared from nowhere in 1992, at 
the moment that an entire social (Yugoslav) reality, which was built and 
                                                          
51 The strategy (probably unconscious) of a dual face – one orientated toward the 
domestic audience, while the other is intended for communication with the outside 
world – has proven to be successful, as highlighted by the fact that the Austrian 
historian Ulf Brunnbauer places Ćirković, together with R. Mihaljčić (also a 
member of the examining committee of the theses of Mišić and Mrgić-Radojčić and 
a reviewer of their books), amongst the messengers of change in the historiography 
of south-eastern Europe, “dissatisfied with the consequences of politics and the 
instrumentalization of politicized historiography” – Brunnbauer (2003): 441. This 
viewpoint is not surprising because, like the majority of badly informed foreigners 
who observe things from the ‘outside’, Brunnbauer relies on the one-sided 
information of his ‘internal’ informers. He is evidently unconscious of the fact that 
in this communication, among other things, he becomes an instrument in the 
strategies of settling scores, so that the information that he receives is less a reliable 
mirror of reality and more a perception of one of the ‘sides in the conflict’. 
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reconstructed over seventy years, suddenly disappeared.52 But, in truth, it 
is worth nothing that this ‘knowledge’ has not taken root easily. Two 
examples from direct communication, on an anecdotal level, can be more 
or less used to illustrate this. A kind reporter from a television station in 
Banja Luka, through whom I came into possession of the book by Jelena 
Mrgić-Radojčić, gave his opinion on this book through a brief comment 
in a conversation: ‘we are Serbs and this (Republika Srpska) is ours, but 
we nevertheless cannot distort history this much’. The second example: a 
student whom I teach in Zagreb, and who happened to attend lectures by 
the aforementioned Milan Vasić at a higher educational institution in 
Banja Luka, related to me that the Professor constantly warned his 
students at his lectures that ‘these new’ historians ‘invent history’ in a 
new (hyper)national key. Taking into consideration the possibility that 
this was all uttered in conversation with an outsider, which is conducted 
differently than the daily communication of a (nationally) homogeneous 
environment, one can nevertheless clearly discern the doubts and cracks 
in the seemingly monolithic new picture of reality and the way it is 
historically generated. 
 
Bosnia vs. Bosnia-Herzegovina 
It would be extremely erroneous for the reader to think that all that has 
been said relates exclusively to Serbs and the whole Serbian 
historiography. On the one hand, undoubtedly not all Serbian academic 
historians are simultaneously ‘national activists’ in the manner that has 
been outlined. Any such attempt at quantification in this sense, without 
detailed and reliable research, would be a complete failure. On the other 
hand, national ‘workers’ and ‘activists’ can be easily recognised amongst 
Croatian and Bosniak-Muslim historians. Being relatively well-
                                                          
52 The process of destruction of the socially constructed reality of the former 
Yugoslavia in the late 1980s and early 1990s, that is, the consequences which that 
destruction had together with the awkward and parallel reconstruction, can now be 
observed with precision in relation to a limited territory which the rebel Serbs in 
Croatia held under their control on the basis of a meticulous and multidimensional 
analysis of relevant sources presented in the work by Nikica Barić (2005). 
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acquainted only with current Croatian historiography,53 I can conclude 
that such a habitus is becoming more and more regarded as unacceptable 
and illegitimate and provokes offence and implicitly includes a certain 
degree of exclusion, based on professional ethics and not ‘directives’ 
received from the political sphere, although one should still not 
completely exclude this. In Bosnia-Herzegovina, however, as much as 
can be discerned from the position of an ‘outside’ observer, the discourse 
of academic historians is still heavily under the influence of wider social 
and political conditions, predominantly registered as 
national/nationalistic. This holds the key to how one should interpret the 
background of the greater part of the practice of shortening the name 
‘Bosnia and Herzegovina’ to ‘Bosnia’ – as an expression of the Bosniak-
Muslim nationalistic discourse, which, from the early 1990s, came out of 
the phase of using the ‘strategies of the weak’ and, at least in one part of 
                                                          
53 It is worth noting that there exists a whole series of texts, which, emerging from 
the need for self-reflection, make possible the consideration of the developmental 
arc of that discipline from 1945 until the present day: Najbar-Agičić (2013); 
Antoljak (2004); Lipovčan & Dobrovšak (2005). 
The picture of this historiography is much more complex than the sketch depicting a 
black and white division into ‘nationalists’ and those that are not, presented by 
authors such as Brunnbauer, Fine and similar ‘objective outside observers’ recruited 
mainly from the camp of ‘experts on Yugoslavia’ who suddenly lost the subject of 
their interests, such as Brunnbauer (2003); Fine (2006). For these authors who view 
the world from a simple perspective, the image of Yugoslavia still flickers before 
their eyes, so that the main divide between the ‘good guys and bad guys’ actually 
reflects their relationship toward the state which originated and was organized by 
the will of foreign political factors, while it disappeared due to the will of its 
citizens. The myth of Yugoslavia as a state that resulted from the wish for 
unification on the part of its ‘peoples’ is clearly visible in, for example, in Lampe 
(2000), or Hudson (2003). For the reality behind that myth as well as for the role of 
foreign factor in creation of Yugoslavia see Djokić (2003), especially paper by 
Rusinow; Drapac (2010) and Evans (2008). Not one of these ‘experts on 
Yugoslavia’ noticed that the subject of their expertise disintegrated before their eyes 
and in vivo precisely because of the will of those who lived in that state, as was 
clearly seen by uninterested analysts of the American CIA in 1990 in the document 
titled, ‘Yugoslavia Transformed: National Intelligence Estimate’ dated 18/12/1990 
begins with the following sentence: “Yugoslavia will cease to function as a federal 
state within one year, and will probably dissolve within two” – Finger (2006): 653-
74.  
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the territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina, became the dominant one and, as a 
result, also turned more aggressive.54 The insistence on this shortening in 
the public discourse, based on the aforementioned background, is entirely 
equal to the use of the term ‘Srpska’ because it expresses the desire for 
domination and, if possible, even greater monopolization of social power, 
which is then substantiated by historical argumentation and the demand 
to ostensibly become a ‘normal country’. At first glance, it might seem 
that the demand for a ‘united and normal country’, which comes from the 
Bosniak-Muslim political and intellectual elite and implies repudiating 
the legitimacy of the national/nationalistic discourse of Croats and Serbs, 
aims for the same thing publicly desired by international factors. Namely, 
if one compares it to my designation of the activity of these international 
factors as illustrated by the words of Price regarding the desire to create a 
‘Bosnian national (state) identity’,55 then it does indeed seem to be a 
question of the same thing. But, while the Bosniak-Muslim discourse 
implies domination, which is given shape in the idea of a ‘foundational 
nation’ that is the basis of the state and the identity which derives from it, 
the idea of a united ‘national (state) identity’ is anchored in the tenets of 
the liberal democratic political culture with its emphasis on the rights of 
the individual, the amended European version of which should be the 
idea of a ‘consociational democracy’.56 The outline of such a superficial 
similarity of aims created, in the period after 1995, an atmosphere in 
which the circles of the Bosniak-Muslim political elite (in particular its 
nationalist segment) became the main allies of international factors. But, 
this alliance is fragile and is untenable in the long run because of basic 
ideological differences. It seems that it is possible here to also invoke the 
                                                          
54 This developmental path is clearly discerned in the short analysis presented in 
Kasapović (2005): 140, even though the author does not herself deduce the 
consequences of her own interpretation. 
55 Price (2002): 144. 
56 See Schöpflin (2001) and the ‘reversal’, above all in the area of analysing the 
views of the Bosniak-Muslim political and intellectual elite, that is reflected in the 
work of Kasapović (2005), who examines the conditions in Bosnia-Herzegovina 
precisely from the angle of the representatives of the idea of a ‘consociational 
democracy’ as a way out of the deep social and political crisis. 
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example of the fragile and untenable alliance between these same 
nationalist circles and the international network of Islamic terrorists,57 for 
whom nationalism, even in the case where it is partly based on Islam, is 
simply unacceptable. What only remains unknown is how long this 
fragile and unstable alliance will last. 
If the frequent shortening of the name ‘Bosnia and Herzegovina’ to 
‘Bosnia’ in the public discourse is the result of a change in the social 
atmosphere, in other words, the result of an increasingly aggressive 
Bosniak-Muslim nationalism, it remains to be seen as to who the 
‘defenders’ of the full name of the country are and why they are 
defending it. Apart from the small number of those who hold firm to 
established norms due to mental inertia and the inability to adjust 
quickly, and in the situation in which (until this moment) Serbian 
nationalists along with the Republika Srpska, do not even want to hear 
about Bosnia and Herzegovina,58 the official name for the country has 
gained advocates from a completely unexpected side. Namely, similarly 
to the way the fiercest Bosniak-Muslim nationalists joined even by 
classic Islamists have called for the application of the liberal rights of the 
individual, within the framework of strategies for realizing their aims, the 
official name of Bosnia-Herzegovina has also become a stronghold of 
resistance of Croatian nationalist discourse. The point in question is that 
of a great ‘ideological shift’, which can be explained by the fact that in 
the early 1990s, and then during the course of the war, this nationalist 
discourse, dependant on conditions in neighbouring Croatia, passed 
through an aggressive phase, marked by the frequent use of the name, 
                                                          
57 Brilliantly shown by Kohlmann (2005). 
58 In the public discourse in the Republika Srpska, as well as in Serbia and 
Montenegro, the name ‘Bosnia-Herzegovina’ is only reserved for the 51% of 
territory which is not included in the Republika Srpska. This goes so far that there 
are, for example, separate labels for imports of various products from Serbia or 
Montenegro, in other words, a separate label ‘for Republika Srpska’ and one ‘for 
Bosnia-Herzegovina’. This then supports the conviction that one is dealing with 
separate countries and states. Here one should remember the expression: ‘the 
former Yugoslav Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina’, which gains its proper 
significance in this context.  
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‘Herzeg-Bosnia’. During the period when the tripartite division of 
Bosnia-Herzegovina appeared to be a very real option,59 this geographical 
term, with its traditional foothold in the Croatian discourse, was meant to 
‘cover’ the Croatian share of the future division. 
But, in the late 1990s and beginning of the 21st century, the total 
political and social atmosphere has essentially changed, in the first 
instance in relation to the marked narrowing of space for the nationalist 
discourse in Croatia. There is also pressure from ‘international factors’, 
which, keeping an eye on the ‘line of least resistance’, demonstrate their 
effectiveness in suppressing ‘ethnic loyalties’ by results attained 
precisely in the Croatian milieu as the weakest. Finally, in the projection 
of future scenarios, there seems to be, especially in light of everything 
that has been said about the reproduction of the Serbian nationalist 
discourse, the very real possibility that, after conducting the referendum 
on the secession of the Republika Srpska, today’s Federation of Bosnia-
Herzegovina (eventually even as ‘Bosnia’) will become the national (that 
is the ‘normal’) state of Bosniaks/Muslims. In that case, the Croats will 
be reduced from a ‘constitutive element’, with at least some mechanisms 
                                                          
59 The idea of a tripartite division was the agenda of all talks on the arrangement of 
internal relations, and later on the ending of the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina, until 
the end of 1993, when the USA, apparently in fear of the international Islamic 
terrorist network establishing roots in this area, began to get involved in the 
situation and relations in Bosnia-Herzegovina, but also Croatia. The first steps of 
the American administration, in the sense of probing the terrain and erecting new 
frameworks for relations - above all, providing guarantees to Croatia for preserving 
internationally recognized borders, as well as the essential restriction of the Islamist 
current on account of the nationalistic faction amongst Bosniaks/Muslims - can be 
clearly discerned from the messages from American officials transmitted to the then 
Croatian President by Croatian diplomats who participated in the work of the 
‘International Conference for the former Yugoslavia’. The whole picture is 
brilliantly outlined by the selectively published transcripts of talks involving the 
Croatian president – see, for example, Lucić (2005): 28, for the situation in which 
C. Redman sent the first of such messages at the beginning of 1994, through the 
intermediaries M. Akmadžić, K. Zubak and M. Žužul, and the manner in which F. 
Tuđman responded. When made possible, an insight into the entirety of the talks 
conducted with the Croatian President will certainly deepen our knowledge of the 
picture but will not essentially alter it.  
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for protection of their collective rights, to the category of a national 
minority without any mechanisms for protection of those same rights. 
Undoubtedly a very popular and very dark projection of the future 
for Croatian nationalists (but not only them), such a scenario is actually 
only one of the very real possibilities. By taking this to its extreme 
consequences, it is possible to presume that, out of the four possible 
options which, according to Will Kymlicka, are open in these situations,60 
the Croatian political elite could decide on two – on one hand there 
would be massive emigration from existing Croatian enclaves (Žepče, 
Lašvanska dolina, Kiseljak, etc.) to Croatia and further to countries 
overseas, while on the other hand, the compact regions populated by 
Croats and bordering Croatia (Herzegovina and Posavina) would demand 
territorial autonomy, which, in the following phase, could end with 
secession and annexation by Croatia. 
However, in order to gain an actual perspective of the possible 
directions of developments, one could outline here the seemingly 
improbable but actually realistic alternative scenario, in the absence of 
factual indicators of the Bosnian-Herzegovinian version of 
‘consociational democracy’. Namely, when projecting into the future one 
should also rely on those results of the war that have still not gained the 
power of official confirmation, but are clearly visible to the cautious 
observer. One of these is the pronounced change in demographic trends, 
which was once one of the most important ‘background’ reasons for the 
outbreak of war. This change in demographic trends is mirrored in the 
fact that the pronounced trend in growth of the Bosniak-Muslim 
population has been interrupted, while the real numerical indicators of 
the share of individual national groups in the total population have also 
been essentially changed. At the beginning of the war, the non-resisted, 
                                                          
60 These are: a) massive emigration, especially in the case that there exists a 
prosperous and friendly neighbouring country; b) the acceptance of new 
circumstances and the attempt to integrate into the majority culture; c) the demand 
for territorial self-government with the aim of creating one’s own economic, 
political and educational institutions; and d) acceptance of the permanent state of 
social marginalization in some sort of self-isolation, Kymlicka (2001): 22. 
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and later almost completely uncontrolled, violence in territories occupied 
by the new Serbian authorities resulted in the ethnic cleansing that, in 
general, directed the Bosniak-Muslim population from eastern and 
western Bosnia, as well as eastern Herzegovina, toward the urban 
settlements in the central parts of Bosnia-Herzegovina, on the one hand, 
and to Western European countries and the USA, on the other. The 
remainder of the Bosniak-Muslims from a part of Herzegovina moved in 
the same direction somewhat later, under the burden, this time, of 
Croatian violence. 
This violence also set in motion the Croatian population of western 
Bosnia and directed it toward the territory of the Republic of Croatia and 
to other countries, and subsequently, from the middle of 1993, violence 
in the territories under the control of authorities from Sarajevo also set in 
motion the Croatian population from the central parts of Bosnia. A part 
of this wave was stopped in Herzegovina, another part overflowed into 
Croatia, while a part of these people ended up in other countries – the 
numbers involved are still a completely unknown quantity. However, in 
relation to projecting into the future, the results of the ethnic cleansing of 
Bosniak-Muslims seem to be especially important in the domain of 
demographic trends. Namely, on the one hand, the massive departure to 
Western European countries and the USA has created a relatively large 
diaspora in a short period, which today accepts, and provides logistical 
support to, the new wave of emigrants now leaving Bosnia-Herzegovina 
due to economic reasons. On the other hand, the transfer of the rural 
population from eastern, and to a lesser extent, western Bosnia, to urban 
settlements has radically changed cultural habits, amongst others, those 
tied to biological reproduction, in other words the number of children in 
families. While in the villages every child, even at the end of the 
twentieth century, was still seen as a ‘few more working hands’, in the 
cities each new child is viewed as ‘one more mouth to feed’, so that the 
number of children per family is being significantly reduced. The 
cumulative effect of all these changes is still not so easily determined, 
and this will be possible only after the results of the census performed in 
2013 are entirely published. 
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It is indicative, however, that the resistance to conducting the 
census and publishing of its results came comes from the Bosniak-
Muslim political elite, which is entirely clear about the fact that, even 
with the limited data which is at its disposal, there is no question of the 
eventual fast attainment of a majority (more than half) in the whole of 
Bosnia-Herzegovina. One should take into consideration that the Serbs 
were also the object of ruthless violence – perhaps not organized to the 
same extent as in the case of the Bosniak-Muslims and Croats, if nothing 
else because of the fact that the other two sides did not control territory 
and conditions in the same manner as the Serbs – directed at their ethnic 
cleansing and as a result a great number of Serbs left areas in which they 
had lived until then, departing for Republika Srpska, Serbia, Montenegro, 
as well as other countries. The final result of the migratory and 
demographic movements during the 1990s for the Serbian population of 
Bosnia-Herzegovina is nevertheless essentially different. One of the most 
important reasons is the fact that a great number of Serbs from Croatia 
found themselves in Bosnia-Herzegovina after 1995,61 which certainly 
                                                          
61 A part of the complex problem of the Serb exodus from Croatia, namely the one 
relating to events from the summer of 1995, is explained in detail by Barić (2005): 
533-67. The final result of that five year exodus is the fact that during the 1990s the 
number of Serbs in Croatia was practically reduced by two-thirds in relation to the 
situation recorded in the 1991 census (this nevertheless sounds substantially 
different from Barić’s formulation, ‘more than half’). The bare numbers are as 
follows: 581,663 Serbs lived in Croatia in 1991, while in 2001 there were 201,631 
Serbs living in the same territory. It is thus a question of a difference of 380,000 
people, and if one takes into consideration those who, within the framework of the 
census categories, referred to themselves as ‘Yugoslavs’, and later referred to 
themselves as Serbs, the number of Serbs who left Croatia climbs to more than 
400,000 people, which is again substantially different from the figures of the 
Croatian authorities from 2000 that referred to ‘around 300,000 Serbs’ who had left 
the country from 1991. Any kind of realistic judgment of the number of those who 
‘stopped’ in Bosnia-Herzegovina is still, without figures from the sources of the 
government of Republika Srpska, out of reach, even an ‘educated guess’, but there 
was no doubt a great number of these people. It is worth noting here: the trap of 
nationalistic discourse and the conceptual set of de-sensitizing the ‘Other’, which it 
produces, comes down to seeing, in such bare numbers – ‘400,000 Serbs’ – another 
400,000 replicas of the war criminals such as Mile Martić, Radovan Karadžić or 
Ratko Mladić (mutatis mutandis, this applies to all national categories which the 
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had an influence on the essential changes in the total ratio of the national 
populations. In other words, it should come as no surprise to anyone if 
the results of the census show a more equal numerical relationship 
between Bosniak-Muslims and Serbs in the whole of Bosnia-
Herzegovina. The new demographic reality, as the result of the war, and 
the huge political capital in the shape of Republika Srpska, could bring 
the Serbian political elite into the completely new position of mastering 
the levers of power to the extent that it could even decisively control 
Bosnia-Herzegovina as a whole. According to this new perspective, the 
process of secession (with or without unification with the ‘mother’ 
country) might even show itself in a less attractive light to that same elite 
than preserving its acquired positions. 
 
Herzegovina 
Therefore, in such changed conditions, which open up a completely new 
and wide spectre of possible scenarios for the future, Croatian 
nationalism is increasingly influenced by the ‘strategies of the weak’ and 
defensive tactics, amongst which one should certainly include the 
insistence on the complete name of Bosnia and Herzegovina. In the 
framework of these defensive tactics within narrowed possibilities of 
action, a more precise connection is now being made between one part of 
the Croatian population in Bosnia-Herzegovina and a ‘Herzegovinian’ 
identity, the significance of which substantially surpasses the regional 
designation. Although this linkage has not until now been shaped into an 
integral historical narrative, its appearance can be traced to the early 
1990s and the period of appropriating the historical figure of the Herzog 
Stjepan Vukčić Kosača (the former Community cultural centre in the 
Croatian part of Mostar thus became ‘Kosača’s House’). In relation to 
this, one could also cite the appeal to the traditions of medieval 
‘Herzegovina’. In the period when Mostar functioned as a completely 
divided city, its Croatian part used, as its coat of arms, the medieval coat 
                                                                                                                                              
nationalistic discourse produces as the ‘Other’), instead of seeing living and 
different individuals with an endless series of personal tragedies. 
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of arms of the Kosača family, in other words, ‘Herzegovina’. Therefore, 
it seems opportune here to at least briefly note the historical reality of the 
terms ‘land of Hum’ and ‘Herzegovina’. 
As I have already written at length about the land of Hum 
(Chulmia) and its traditions and the form of identity that developed from 
it,62 I will only repeat here the most important points. As a politically 
separate entity, completely unconnected with contemporary Bosnia, or 
the Banate of Bosnia, the land of Hum functioned as a principality until 
1326. In a territorial sense this term is substantially different from 
present-day Herzegovina – it roughly included, in a west-east direction, 
the area from Vrulje and the great bend of the Cetina River to the 
hinterland of Dubrovnik, including Stolac, with the coastal belt stretching 
to Pelješac; in a south-north direction, the land of Hum stretched from the 
Adriatic coast to the upper Neretva River and Konjic. For the period for 
which we have access to more complete information from the sources, 
which means from the mid-12th century onwards, it is known that the 
Prince recognized the senior rights of the Hungarian king, as well as the 
Serbian King for a shorter period in the 13th century. After the Bosnian 
Ban Stjepan (Stephen) IV (even though he was indeed the fourth Ban 
with that name, he has entered the literature, and remains known to this 
day, as Stjepan II) conquered the country in that year, it formally ceased 
to be an independent principality, but further retained, completely in line 
with medieval understandings and the way in which medieval states 
functioned, some form of a separate political life and all elements of the 
former internal organization. This relates in the first place to a type of 
representative body, the most important function of which was the 
judicial one (‘the court of Hum’), which continued to act according to the 
formerly established traditional procedure (‘the question of Hum’). To be 
sure, a part of the ruling elite tied itself to the new supreme ruler, but his 
rule lasted, at least in the western part of the country, on the right bank of 
the Neretva, for only around thirty years. Namely, in 1356, the Bosnian 
Ban was forced to surrender this area to the Hungarian king, under whose 
                                                          
62 For everything that follows, unless otherwise noted, see Ančić (2001). 
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rule it remained until 1390. Throughout this period, the function of the 
local chief was again re-established in this area, but this time not as a 
(semi)independent ruler and prince, but rather as the King’s 
representative. 
From 1390 the land of Hum is again under the rule of the Bosnian 
king, but under the direct administration of the local noble family of 
Jurjević-Radivojević. But, already in 1410, the land of Hum begins to be 
included in the province under the rule of Sandalj Hranić Kosača, a 
province that, under Sandalj’s nephew and successor, Herzog Stjepan, 
will begin to function more and more as an almost independent political 
organism. In a territorial sense, the Herzog’s province far surpassed – in 
the mid-15th century when it was completely built as the administrative 
cradle of the future Herzegovina – the land of Hum and included, at 
certain moments, the territory from Omiš in the west, to the upper and 
middle Drina Valley, and even parts of Zeta in the east. 
Nevertheless, even in the early 1450s, during a rebellion against his 
father, the Herzog’s son Vlatko could build his base and stronghold 
amongst the nobles of Hum, whom he mobilized and got on his side 
precisely by appealing to the distinctiveness of Hum. Apart from the 
aforementioned traditional forms of ‘collective action’, which formed the 
institutional network through which the identity of the nobility of Hum 
was reproduced and thus represented one of the foundations upon which 
it was possible to bring about a massive political mobilization, it is 
certainly worth noting that, already in the 14th century, this identity had a 
strong foothold and support in discursive literacy. Namely, during the 
time when the western part of the country was under the direct rule of the 
Hungarian king, in other words under the administration of his 
representatives in the 1360s, the Chronicle of Hum was written (in 
circumstances which cannot be considered in depth here as that would far 
surpass the nature of this text) in the eastern part of the country; this 
chronicle certainly represented, in later times, a firm stronghold of the 
separate identity of the local ruling elite. It has not, however, been 
preserved in its original form, but its content, and its entire narrative, 
dedicated to the lords of Hum (humskim gospodarima), is recognizable in 
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the excerpts included by the 17th century Ragusan historian Mavro Orbini 
in his work, The Kingdom of the Slavs.63 
Therefore, this identity, deeply anchored, on the one hand, in forms 
of ‘collective action’ and the solidarity derived from them, and the 
discursive literacy, through which the permanent picture of the 
community was produced, on the other, expanded and was protected in 
the depths of society and functioned as a motivational factor of real 
actions. The expansion into the depth of society is best attested by the 
fact that, during the 14th and 15th centuries, all migrants from the land of 
Hum in the Dalmatian cities (Split, Trogir, Šibenik, Zadar) identified 
themselves as such for all occasions, regardless of their status and 
position – by their origin they were, or they came from, the land of Hum 
(Comsqua semia). On the other hand, in only one case, recorded in Split 
in 1454, did an individual identify as someone coming from the 
‘Principality of the Herzog Stjepan [the] Bosnian’.64 The Herzog himself 
did not equate his province with the land of Hum, and it is very 
significant that, when creating his title of Herzog, he had doubts as to 
what territorial content to give to that title. The detailed and reliable 
research of Ćirković65 has shown that Stjepan Vukčić Kosača ‘awarded’ 
himself the title Herzog, looking, in the first instance, to the example of 
the ‘Herzog of Split’, Hrvoje Vukčić Hrvatinić, so that he even tried to 
obtain such a title in Venice. In the early period, however, he linked his 
                                                          
63 Orbini (1968): 189-93. This text is recognized by S. Ćirković as an adaptation of 
the lost chronicle, which he provisionally called the History of the Lords of Hum 
(Istorija humskih gospodara), in his commentaries on Orbini’s work, cautioning 
that the same text was used by Orbini’s contemporary, Jakov Lukarević, also a 
Ragusan historian – Orbini (1968): 426-27. Orbini and Lukarević otherwise 
supplemented each other’s work and cooperated closely, and together they 
participated, above all through their historiographical work, in the grandiosely 
imagined political enterprise of liberating the Balkans from the Turks, which ended 
in nothing – see the excellent and most recent account of these events, Ćosić & 
Vekarić (2005): 20. 
64 State Archive in Zadar, Archive in Split, vol. 25/9, fol. 11’-2, 06.06.1454. A 
certain Vladić Ratković declared that he came from de comitatu Duche Stephani 
bossinensis. 
65 Ćirković (1964): 106-08. 
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new title to the land of Hum, so that in the first months he called himself 
the ‘Herzog of Hum and the Littoral’. He quickly changed this, however, 
and began to further call himself the ‘Herzog of St. Sabba’, referring, in 
his communication with the outside world, to the fact that this was a 
‘saint who performed great miracles’, and whose grave, in the monastery 
of Mileševo, was found in an area he ruled and administered. One cannot 
with certainty establish whether, by using such a title in his domestic 
communication, he relied on the traditions of the Nemanjić dynasty (and, 
if so, to what extent), and in that way tried to mobilize all those of his 
subjects who preserved memory of this ruling family, as interpreted by 
Ćirković. It is indicative, however, that his subject Vladić Ratković 
nevertheless referred to him as the Bosnian Duke (Herzog) in 1454, so 
that, seen from this angle, one should not be surprised that identification 
with his province did not succeed in becoming deep-rooted until the 
Ottoman conquests of these areas in the 1470s and 1480s. 
From the preceding analysis, one can clearly discern that the 
identity of Hum was a typical medieval form of identity, dependent on 
the political formation that had developed out of the framework of an 
early medieval ethnic community (Humljani), and which, under the 
conditions of the Ottoman occupation, with the disappearance of the old 
social elite and without the support of the social reality through which it 
could reproduce itself, was condemned to dying off and disappearance. 
Its bearers, those who met at the ‘Court of Hum’ and appealed to the 
traditions of Hum, were either killed in battles or emigrated, or, in the 
long term, accepted the new framework of identity through the process of 
Islamicization. It is difficult to gain a sense of how long the latter 
(notorious amongst the older Muslims as Poturi),66 retained the old 
medieval memories, but it does not seem difficult to conclude that, by the 
fourth or fifth generation, the identity of a distant ancestor was of little 
real significance to the descendant of a former ‘nobleman of Hum’. 
Indicative in this regard is the fact that the aforementioned Chronicle of 
Hum was preserved in Dubrovnik and not in the place where it was 
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created and where it was actually read and used. The emergence of 
Herzegovina and the shaping of a new form of regional identity no longer 
had, as in the case of the Lower Regions and Bosnian Krajina, any ties 
with the land of Hum and its traditions. Even when Vladić Ratković 
identified himself in 1454 as a person who comes from the Herzog’s 
‘state’, this formulation (‘the Principality of Herzog Stjepan’ – comitatus 
duce Stephani), which apparently fairly precisely mirrors what Vladić 
actually uttered, was far from any idea of the ‘Herzog’s land – 
Herzegovina’. 
This completely new form of a geographical name – Herzegovina – 
has its roots in the system of territorial-administrative and military 
organization of the Ottoman Empire. Namely, in the first period after the 
conquest, Ottoman organization relied on the existing system of 
proprietary relations and concomitant administrative divisions, so that 
during the 1460s, the former noble estates of the Pavlović and Kovačević 
families, as well as those of Herzog Stjepan, functioned as administrative 
regions of the newly established Ottoman Bosnian sanjak (sancak), in 
whose titles the memory of the former ‘lords’ was still preserved: vilayet 
Pavli – ‘the land of the Pavlovići’, vilayet Kovač – ‘the land of the 
Kovačevići’, vilayet Hersek – ‘the land of the Herzog’.67 
With the strengthening of the new authorities, the territorial 
military and administrative divisions changed and adapted to new 
necessities. Since the key function of the Ottoman Empire during the 
period of the rise of its power – and older and younger authorities are in 
agreement about this68 – was the expansion of the ‘House of Islam’ (dar 
al-Islam) at the expense of the ‘House of War’ (dar al-Harb), which 
could be achieved only by relying on military force, the territorial 
military organization also represented the key to the administrative 
organization. In this system, the most important role belonged to the 
large units of professional cavalrymen, who rode in military raids under 
                                                          
67 For all that follows on the Ottoman administrative organization, if not otherwise 
noted, see the detailed explanation in Šabanović (1982), and Inalçik (1973): 104-18. 
68 See, for example, Sugar (1977): 8 and Goffman (2002): 46. 
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the same symbol, the banner (sanjak) which their commander received 
from the Sultan himself. For their service, these professional cavalrymen 
enjoyed landed property and were called tımarlı sipahis, while their 
commander bore the title of bey. The territory from which these large 
units were mobilized, and on which the properties of the tımarlı sipahis 
were arranged, also fell under the peacetime executive authority of the 
same bey; this territory was called a sanjak according to the symbol used 
for identification during the order of battle, from which the full title of 
the commander was derived – sanjak-bey. However, the affairs of civil 
administration, according to the principles of Islamic religious law 
(sharia), were, in reality, administered by judges (kadı or qadi). The 
territory under the powers of an individual kadı (kadıluk) covered the 
territory from which members of the smaller component parts of the large 
units were recruited (arpalık – vilayet), so that in this way the parallelism 
of the military and administrative territorial organization was maintained. 
With the expansion of the areas under the Sultan’s rule came the 
expansion and addition of the network of territorial organization through 
the creation and organizing of new sanjaks, and within them, 
arpalıks/vilayets and kadıluks. Already in 1470, after the conquest of a 
large part of the estates of Herzog Stjepan, a new sanjak was organized 
out of the former component part of the Bosnian sanjak (which was first 
organized out of the existing Bosnian Kingdom), the vilayet Hersek (‘the 
Herzog’s land’). This new sanjak preserved, in its title, memory of the 
way in which it had emerged, so that it is today called ‘Herzegovina’ 
when translating from the Turkish, while the direct reliance on the 
tradition of the former Herzog’s estates is mirrored in the reach of its 
territorial expansion. Namely, the new sanjak expanded territorially for 
some twenty more years until the Turkish conquests began to encompass 
parts of the medieval Croatian Kingdom, out of which the new sanjak 
under the name of ‘Klis’ (Kilis Sancağı) was then organized.  
But the Ottoman sanjaks were far from being able to offer a 
realistic and firm social framework of identification, even more so 
because of the importance they had, above all, for the military class. 
Participation in raids under the command of a sanjak-bey, as well as 
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performing different tasks on his account on the territory of a sanjak in 
times of peace, created, to be sure, the mechanisms of ‘collective action’ 
through a relatively thick network of social interactions, out of which 
arose solidarity and mutual loyalty, but only within the framework of the 
military class. But, this military class, at least in the beginning, did not 
have at its disposal hereditary estates and was not tied to a certain 
territory. Besides this, the sanjak-beys were frequently replaced, so that 
they could not become the focus of loyalty and narratives that could 
impress a more permanent picture of the community into consciousness, 
as was once the case with hereditary ‘lords’ in the medieval period. On 
the other hand, as a theocratic (Islamic) state, the Ottoman Empire 
brought – already at the level of the millet organization – religious 
affiliation to the fore amongst its subjects.69 Social status and the 
possibility of social promotion depended on religious affiliation to a great 
extent, so that it no doubt made the formation of any other identity more 
difficult. 
To be sure, time and the dynamics of social fluctuations introduced 
changes into this world, beginning with the process of Islamicization, the 
establishment of permanent, hereditary estates belonging to the tımarlı 
sipahis, the full adoption of new forms of written culture, and extending 
to the shifting of borders and their final consolidation at the end of the 
17th century. The clashes on the border of the Empire in the 17th century 
also finally shaped the narratives which, either in the form of oral 
tradition or in the form of discursive literacy, more permanently 
consolidated the social communities created through various forms of 
interaction. It is worth observing here in this context, at least briefly, that 
the process of forming the Ottoman sanjak of Herzegovina until the mid-
                                                          
69 Within the postmodern approach to history, the reliability of the historiography of 
the constructed picture of the millet organization of the Empire (millet=religious 
community) has been brought into question, but for the time being no such attempt 
of deconstructing that picture has provided convincing results. For the standard 
account, see Sugar (1977): 44, 273. The reality of this organization and the way in 
which it functioned in one part of the Empire throughout three centuries is 
examined in detail by Džaja (1999). 
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18th century also acquired a Christian narrative version, recorded in 
written form for the first time in the work Cvit razgovora naroda i jezika 
iliričkoga aliti rvackoga (‘The Flower of Conversation of the Illyrian or 
Croatian People and Language’), printed in Venice in 1747 by the 
Franciscan Filip Grabovac. In an effort to outline the historical 
narratives, or as he himself said, the ‘origins and beginning’ (izod i 
početak) of various contemporary ethnic communities and political 
formations, Grabovac devoted one page of his work to Herzegovina. He 
explained that Herzegovina was the former ‘Upper Dalmatia’, which 
“adhered to Servia” (se je držala Šervijom), and was later called the 
“Banate of Santo Saba”, while “from Ban Stipan [Stjepan] the Herzog it 
is called ‘Ercegovina [Herzegovina] today” and still bears that name. 
Grabovac knew that ‘ban Stipan the Herzog’ belonged to the house of 
Kosača, but how it came to be that this ‘house’ ruled ‘Ercegovina from 
1317 is not entirely clear.70 The erudite monk who was in fact the 
chaplain of Croatian units in the service of the Venetian Republic, 
endeavoured to pour the knowledge collected in Venetian libraries into 
the popular discourse and in that way create a system into which one 
ought to fit his Croats (‘Rvati) and find their place within the framework 
of the entire human history. Therefore, if Grabovac knew about the land 
of Hum (which he probably did via Orbini), it was no longer important 
and relevant. His reflections, however, clearly shift the focus from the 
Ottoman sanjak to the traditions of the medieval Christian ‘lord’ thereby 
‘appropriating’ and transmitting the ‘origins and beginning’ of the 
Ottoman territorial-administrative unit into the dimension of Christian 
tradition. But, religious divisions and the primary loyalty given to the 
millet, which is clearly shown in this process of ‘appropriation’ of 
memory and the traditions built upon it, disabled the complete grouping 
of regional identities that could surpass religious contrasts. The final 
result of these complex processes is manifested in the first half of the 19th 
century when that regional affiliation gains in weight in the framework of 
relations within the religious and (proto)national communities. Thus, 
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within the framework of the rebellion of Husein-kapetan Gradaščević, 
the Herzegovinian beys under the leadership of Ali-pașa Rizvanbegović 
clash with the Bosnian beys, remaining on the side of the central 
authorities and as a reward these authorities created a separate 
Herzegovinian pashaluk in 1833, while the Franciscans of Herzegovinian 
descent ‘seceded’ (odiljuju i odcipljuju se) from the Franciscan province 
of Bosna Argentina around 1845. 
Here it is certainly worth noting – according to the versions of the 
past constructed during the last 150 years, during the period of Ottoman 
rule social communication across the boundaries of religious groups 
(millets) practically did not exist, so that, in the clash of the Bosnian and 
Herzegovinian begs on the one hand, and the Bosnian and Herzegovinian 
Franciscans on the other, one does not search for any eventual 
connections and mutual influences.71 One should draw attention to the 
fact that, in particular, the Croatian and Serbian versions of the history of 
the period from the end of the fifteenth century to the mid-19th century 
are the result of the subsequent attempt to remove the ‘Oriental strain’ 
from one’s own history, which the Slovenian anthropologist Božidar 
Jezernik compared with the attempt of African-Americans to remove, 
through washing, the colour of their skin.72 The removal of every trace of 
Ottoman influence, as well as communication and interaction with the 
‘odious occupier’, as the Ottoman Empire began to be viewed in the mid-
19th century, is the consequence, as clearly demonstrated by Jezernik, of 
influences that came from the European West in this period. These 
influences came in the form of understandings carried over from the 
‘developed world’, which, in the 19th century, completely ‘Orientalized’ 
the ‘Turks’ and everything ‘Ottoman’ and represented them in a negative 
light. Accordingly, the effort was made to remove as soon as possible 
Ottoman traces from the areas the Empire was withdrawing from. In the 
                                                          
71 See, for example, the manner in which, similarly to many others before and after 
him, the construction of the monastery of Široki Brijeg and the concomitant setting 
of the foundations for the future Herzegovinian Franciscan province is shown in 
Nuić (1998): 19. 
72 Jezernik (2004). 
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same way, everything that spoke of normal relations and cooperation in 
circumstances which required it were removed from the collective 
memory through historical and (para)historical analyses and articulation. 
This memory, on the other hand, retained everything that spoke of 
oppression, injustices, heroic resistance (in reality, this was frequently 
ordinary outlawry and sometimes even banditry) and conflicts.73 When, 
however, it appeared that the task of ‘cleansing’ was brought almost to an 
end, the discourse in the ‘developed world’ was, in line with wider social 
conditions, fundamentally changed. Now the descendants of those who 
spoke of ‘Oriental deformity’ (and thus instigated the need to remove the 
traces of this ‘deformity’ in order for the newly ‘liberated’ societies to 
adopt Western norms) began to be astonished and shocked by the fact 
that almost all visible traces of Ottoman civilization were removed from 
areas once ruled by the Sultan.  
Rejecting, therefore, the black-and-white paradigm of historical 
developments, it is certainly worth noting that the construction of the 
monastery of Široki Brijeg, alongside the Herzegovinian Franciscan 
province, could not have occurred without some form of cooperation 
with local Muslims. It is difficult to clearly establish whether the most 
important role in this case was layed by money or political reasons (the 
pashaluk of Herzegovina also had to institutionally accommodate the 
Catholic millet), or seemingly by both. In any case, this form of 
cooperation between the elites of the two communities, surely not the 
first and only example, could have generated, in different circumstances, 
a completely different set of relations. However, the outcome was 
determined by the fact that precisely in this period there was a cultural 
revival in full swing, a revival which set the foundation for the 
construction of modern national communities in the wider region of 
Central-East and South-East Europe. For its part, the construction of 
modern nations relegated the regional identities of old multi-ethnic 
empires to the background of social communication, so that Herzegovina 
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too only remained a regional term of reference, which, during the course 
of the 20th century, has more frequently acquired a pejorative meaning. 
Why such an image was created – and which was most precisely outlined 
by the English journalist and publicist Misha Glenny, who asserted, in an 
otherwise fairly popular work, that Herzegovina was a region “where the 
most primitive branches of the Serbian and Croatian tribes live”74 – is a 
problem that deserves much more space than permitted by this essay. 
Summarizing what has been written about the land of Hum and 
Herzegovina in the preceding lines, it is certainly worth emphasising that 
an organic connection does not exist between the two terms, in other 
words, the creation of Ottoman Herzegovina meant the natural decline of 
the older identity of Hum, which, in simple terms, remained a social ‘dry 
branch’. On the other hand, the social construction of the Ottoman sanjak 
of Herzegovina implied the ever greater role of religious affiliation, 
which included the intensification of differences upon the basis of which 
a different approach to limited available resources was employed. In the 
long term, this will practically disable the shaping of a collective identity 
which was maintained throughout the entire Middle Ages in the land of 
Hum. When, in the 19th century, modern nations started to be formed in 
this region out of the framework of religious groups, Herzegovina 
remained, primarily because of its religious heterogeneity, a national 
periphery. Alongside this, it retained, due to its preservation of a rural 
structure, the function of a demographic well for the more developed and 
already urbanized central national areas, which were thus able to be 
biologically renewed. With such a past and after the massive (forced) 
exodus of Bosniak-Muslims, Croats and Serbs from various parts of 
(what is today called) Herzegovina in the early 1990s, this region has 
now become clearly divided along national lines. In the most recent 
                                                          
74 Cited in Bax (1995): xvii. He accepts Glenny’s formulation about Herzegovina as 
the most precise description of his own observations and research. The work in 
question is Glenny’s work The Fall of Yugoslavia, which was published by Penguin 
in 1992 and was very influential in creating the image of the conflict in the former 
Yugoslavia. For a commentary of Glenny’s views on Herzegovina, see Žanić 
(1998): 91. 
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times, this sort of Herzegovina is becoming one of the last obstacles on 
the path to a simplified ‘Bosnian knot’. With a small play of words, the 
situation could be described in the following manner: the removal of 
‘Herzegovina’ from the official name of the state (which almost no one 
still takes seriously on 49% of its territory, but which also does not mean 
that this situation will remain the same) would simplify the image of 
Bosnia as the mother country of the Bosniaks (Muslims). The elimination 
of the Croatian national/nationalistic discourse, firmly rooted and more 
and more linked precisely to ‘Herzegovina’, would also simplify the task 
of ‘international factors’ in constructing a ‘national (state) identity and 
loyalty’ to Bosnia (without Herzegovina). In other words, the 
maintenance of Herzegovina in the official name of the country is felt by 
Croatian circles to be a guarantee of maintaining at least the already 
attained level of collective rights.  
In this situation, therefore, the Croats have remained – through a 
kind of historical irony – practically the last persistent defenders of the 
political heritage of the Ottoman sanjak and the short-lived pashaluk of 
Herzegovina, ‘appropriated’ through an interpretation which transmits its 
emphasis onto the (imagined) medieval tradition. Some projections of the 
future have attempted to show this heritage of an incontestably regional 
identity as the last foothold of Croatian survival on the political map of 
(the still existing) Bosnia and Herzegovina. On the basis of these ideas, 
one could easily turn to the construction of a new historical narrative 
which should secure the historical legitimacy (‘historical right’) of the 
Croatian demand for Herzegovina, and which would mean that, on the 
level of national/nationalistic discourse, the Serbs would tie themselves 
to Republika Srpska, the Bosniak-Muslims to Bosnia, and the Croats to 
Herzegovina. With such historical interpretations and wrangling, on the 
trail left by Grabovac and the discourse typical for ‘national activists’, it 
would even be possible to construct some narrative that would connect 
the traditions of Hum and Herzegovina, and search for a way within this 
framework to simplify Croatian separateness within (Bosnia and) 
Herzegovina. This task would not, however, be differentiated in any way 
from the persistent re-shaping of history that needs to prove the nebulous 
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idea of the ‘continuity of Bosnian statehood’ and the ‘Bosnian nation’ 
stretching back, no more and no less, than a thousand years,75 or the 
‘invention of (Serbian) traditions’,76 which has already been discussed. 
But these undertakings nevertheless seem to be a useless waste of 
personal and social energy. In fact, if we return for a moment to the 
already cited Schöpflin it is worth conveying one of his warnings tied to 
the discussion on the social functions of national historical narratives 
(myths), and which precisely here finds its full application. Namely, 
observing that these narratives (myths) narrow the cognitive field and 
reduce complex realities to more simple and easily understood concepts 
and forms, the author draws attention to the possibility that this 
simplification can alienate the discourse from reality. In this way, the 
produced ‘knowledge’ no longer corresponds to reality and thus becomes 
‘very harmful’.77 Translated into the language of practical activity this 
means: if the Croatian political elite wishes to achieve some kind of 
territorial self-administration, then it has no need of an historical 
narrative, but rather a well worked out plan with precise aims, upon the 
basis of which one can then achieve massive political mobilization 
necessary in democratic procedures. In connection with this, it is worth 
immediately cautioning: the protection of collective rights in post-
communist Europe is directly connected with the right to (territorial) self-
administration and autonomy,78 so that there is no reason to seek 
additional historical arguments for a demand that is also politically 
legitimate per se in Bosnia and Herzegovina (an integral part, as one 
likes to say, of post-communist Europe). Alongside all that has been said, 
one needs, however, to add something more. The construction of a 
discourse directed to the demonstration of ‘historical rights’, which are 
always at someone’s disposal and always disputed by others, and which 
                                                          
75 See, for example, Ančić (2001a): 229-60, or Kværne (2003). 
76 The ‘invention of tradition’ is one of the strategies of constructing a national 
(nationalist) discourse, as was shown long ago by Hobsbawm (1983). 
77 Schöpflin (1997): 23. What the expression ‘very harmful’ can imply is illustrated 
by the discussion in Ančić (2001a): 236-41. 
78 For more on this see Rady (1993): 720 and Kymlicka & Opalski (2001). 
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are realistically equally unprovable and indisputable, creates an optical 
illusion in which one no longer speaks of reality (either historical or 
actual) but rather about ‘which side are you on, ours or theirs’ (let us 
recall the request directed to Iso Kršnjavi from the editorship of Obzor). 
The emotional engagement that demands such a (circular) discourse 
clouds one’s view and also enables incompetence and corruption to be 
concealed by the acceptance and involvement of individuals within the 
discursive framework. And this is what Bosnia and Herzegovina, in this 
moment, needs the least of, along with the ‘overheated’ and completely 
useless debate on what the country should be called.  
 
Appendix: Are ‘Foreigners’ always objective? 
The war that was fought between 1990 and 1995 in the area of the former 
Yugoslavia, and which really should be described, with the most precise 
expression, as ‘the War of Yugoslav Succession’. The war in Kosovo in 
1998/99 and the NATO intervention, as well as the conflict in Macedonia 
after 2000 can no longer be considered a part of the first conflict, but 
rather a separate conflict. One of the important questions which this war 
presented is the following: how is the image of events in a region that is 
physically very close, ‘in Europe’, but symbolically so far, ‘in the 
Balkans’, created and formed. The problem appears on the level of both 
daily reporting and scholarly discourse, whereby one of the initial 
premises is the one according to which ‘foreigners’, in these situations, 
are significantly more objective than ‘local players’, who unfailingly, 
according to this same logic, seek to push through their agendas and their 
viewpoints. But, although this logic operates seductively, life is more 
complex than simplified set rules, so that very frequently ignorance and a 
lack of information goes along with the position of a ‘foreign’ observer 
and this very easily transforms such an observer into the prey of ‘local 
players’ who, in this way, succeed in securing a name for their agendas 
and viewpoints as ‘objective’. On the other hand, where the level of 
knowledge of conditions is significantly higher, such as in the scholarly 
discourse, the formal position of a ‘foreigner’ is very frequently 
transformed, with time and owing to the establishment of firm 
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connections, into the real position of a ‘local player’, who is better 
acquainted, and is even connected with one of the sides, but endeavours 
to create the semblance of a retained ‘objectivity’. I will attempt to 
briefly illustrate all these problems with a few examples which show that 
‘outside’ observers do not a priori have a more advantageous position 
than insiders.  
I am firstly turning to a personal experience that is, at least in part, 
corroborated by the record of an ‘outside’ observer. At the beginning of 
the War of Yugoslav Succession I lived and worked in Sarajevo, in 
which I spent an entire year of the war, before leaving, or migrating, 
from that city in 1993. Sometime in mid-summer 1992, after three or four 
months of the war spent in an apartment on the front line in one of the 
urban settlements on the outskirts of the city, an English journalist and 
his (locally leased) cameraman appeared in the building. They were 
seeking ‘stories’ and the situation in which they found me presumably 
seemed attractive to them, while it was probably not without significance 
that there were not many people in the building with whom the English 
journalist would be able to converse in his own language. Essentially, 
they found me at the moment when I took my young daughter, a seven 
years old child who happily departed the hell of war with her older sister 
a few days later, out of the cellar for a rare walk in the fresh air. One had 
to exit the building through the cellar window because the entry door, 
facing the small square of estates completed four years before the 
beginning of the war, was closed with a chain in case someone tried to 
exit at this side – namely, the square faced toward the suburbs of family 
homes that were occupied by the Serbian army, taking advantage of the 
fact that a large barracks of the ‘Yugoslav People’s Army’ (JNA) was 
located in this settlement. The war began in this micro-world a few days 
prior than in the remainder of the city – around midday one day an 
armoured vehicle appeared on the square, stopped in the middle of it, and 
then the machine gun on the top of the vehicle began to fire at random at 
the buildings. After the withdrawal of the vehicle, the gunfire continued 
from the first houses of the neighbouring settlement and it did not cease. 
I only saw my former building for the first time from the ‘front’ side 
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when the war ended and I visited Sarajevo in 1996. 
The English journalist (years later I discovered via the internet that 
he was called Sean Maguire) visited my apartment, which was then 
considerably demolished by missiles of various types fired from the 
neighbouring settlement, stayed for a conversation for about half an hour 
and then decided to film a ‘story’. He filmed my study, a short 
conversation, and then my daughter and I ‘enacted’ a scene in which we 
exited through the cellar window. The journalist and cameraman left, 
while I quickly, under the burden of surviving the war, forgot about the 
whole episode. Some months later, when winter began to pinch, I met, on 
the street, a pre-war acquaintance who stopped me and told me an almost 
unbelievable story – this acquaintance was a Serb and, whenever he 
could, he regularly watched the Serbian television program. Sometime 
before the end of summer, he watched a news report on the war in 
Sarajevo on Serbian state television in Belgrade, and, at one point, saw a 
sequence in which my daughter and I came out of the cellar window, 
along with the explanation that we were unprotected Serbs, who were not 
being permitted to lead a normal life by ‘savage Muslim hordes’. It did 
not take me long to understand that the journalist was a free-lancer who 
had placed his material on the market. It remains a mystery as to why a 
snapshot of the exiting of a long-haired man with a ponytail and small 
child through a cellar window was appealing to Serbian television. The 
only trace of the whole story in which I was transformed, thanks to an 
‘objective foreigner’, into a Serb being maltreated by ‘savage Muslim 
hordes’ remains the text of the diary record of Sean Maguire published in 
the London Review of Books and today available on the internet.79 
The illusion of a realistic picture of reality captured by the 
objective camera is therefore more favourable for various forms of 
manipulation than words written and printed on paper, or left for viewing 
in the virtual world of the internet. It is possible to respond to the written 
word and attempt to draw attention to the existence of the ‘other side of 
                                                          
79 Maguire (1992). Although I cannot recall the conversation, I doubt that it was 
limited only to what Maguire reproduced in one sentence. 
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the medal’ or even lies, but there is really no possibility of reaction to, 
and eventual correction of, a report in the form of a picture broadcast in 
the news that disappears at the moment it is seen. During the war years, I 
repeatedly heard from people who had the opportunity to watch 
television that, in their news reports, various television stations used the 
same film material that shows the victims of the war in opposite contexts, 
so that the same dead people ‘played’ the roles of Bosniaks, Croats and 
Serbs. Indeed, national affiliation is not written on the bodies of the dead 
nor can it be recognized. The relatively well-known journalist Sylvia 
Poggioli took one such case into consideration in an article which has 
appeared as an argument in the later discussions of scholars who have 
grappled with the War of Yugoslav succession in their research and 
work. Namely, Poggioli gives an account of a television program on the 
crime committed in Gospić in 1991 in which two murdered Serbs were 
shown as Croats who had been killed by Serb rebels.80 
There is no reason not to believe the story told in 1993 and which 
began on the occasion of Poggioli receiving the ‘George Foster Peabody’ 
award for her reports on the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina, but here it 
seems to me to be important to draw attention to something that is only 
revealed incidentally in her text and something that the author herself 
would have surely attempted to conceal if she had been conscious of the 
meaning of her words. Describing in dramatic words her journey in 
‘northern Bosnia’ in the summer of 1992, Poggioli wishes to highlight 
that she found herself in a situation in which the battlefield of war was a 
terra incognita, in both a literal and metaphorical sense. Manifestly 
alluding to her own experience, she asserts: 
 
“Covering the disintegration of Yugoslavia has often 
forced reporters to act as scouts without compasses in 
a completely unknown terrain … Reporters have had 
to wade through the complex cultural, historical and 
                                                          
80 The text, ‘1993: Scouts without Compass’ is available at: 
http://niemanreports.org/articles/1993-scouts-without-compasses/ (last access 
4/3/2016). 
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political geography of these conflicts. And very few 
had the necessary instruments.”  
 
The argument appears convincing until the point in the text when it is 
revealed that Poggioli did not ‘fall from the skies’ in ‘northern Bosnia’ in 
the summer of 1992. She began her work in the former Yugoslavia four 
years earlier, when she arrived “in Belgrade in October 1988 for my first 
assignment in Yugoslavia.” At first glance it seems that in those four 
years she did not learn anything about the state from which she was 
reporting, even though the same state was literally disintegrating before 
her own eyes during that entire period. Her great ‘discovery’ about the 
difference between ‘cosmopolitan Sarajevo’ and ‘rural Bosnia’, which 
she made ‘just before the outbreak of the conflict’ (she obviously ‘did not 
know’ even then that the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina already began on 1st 
of October 1991 when the Serbian army destroyed the village of Ravno 
and its surrounding hamlets) stands true, but is in complete contrast with 
the beginning of her text and her narration about the journey to ‘northern 
Bosnia’, which is presented as a terra incognita. And not only that – 
Poggioli cites a whole series of examples of manipulation of information 
(part of which indeed appear to be credible), from which it is clearly 
discernible that she followed the war closely and obviously knew who 
was fighting and why. But, curiously enough, the negative heroes of all 
her stories are the Slovenes, Croats and Bosnians, so that the following 
sentences are not surprising in the least:  
 
“The best known examples of vast exaggeration were 
reports of the massive damage inflicted on Dubrovnik, 
the magnificent medieval fortress city on the Adriatic. 
For months, Croatian media reported that the 
monuments in the old quarter had been devastated by 
Yugoslav Army shells and mortars. Western journalists 
who visited the walled city after the campaign ended 
reported seeing only superficial damage.” 
 
To these words I can only add that in October 1993, when I came to 
Dubrovnik for the first time after the beginning of the war (and it was 
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then already considerably restored), the city certainly did not look like 
Vukovar or Mostar, but at least 30% of houses in the old town were still 
without roofs; individual buildings on the main street, the Stradun, were 
still only bare walls that created the semblance of buildings; the hotel 
‘Imperijal’ and the ‘Inter-university centre’ were completely destroyed, 
etc. The words of Poggioli, written in 1993, suddenly begin to sound as 
an echo of the well-known statement of the then Lieutenant-Colonel of 
the Serbian army, Milan Gvero, who, on 4 December 1991, stated, 
without blinking: “The JNA did not bombard Dubrovnik and not one 
particle of dust fell on that city from the side of the JNA”, while Belgrade 
television broadcast, as confirmation of that lie, film footage of the city 
in flames alongside commentary that the Croats were burning car tyres in 
order to ‘deceive the world’.81 After all of this, Poggioli’s opinion that the 
Serbs really only have themselves to blame because their self-isolation 
led to a bad image in the eyes of the world, and not at all the fact that the 
Serbian political leadership initiated and led the War of Yugoslav 
succession with the massive support of its population, should no longer 
surprise anyone. 
This is not a question of establishing moral responsibility for 
spoken and written words (this remains the personal problem of 
Poggioli), nor is it a question of why and how a sojourn in Belgrade 
made a Serbian spokeswoman out of an American journalist of Italian 
origin – and that is exclusively her personal matter. Rather it is a question 
of noting that Poggioli was not the only one who acted in this way and 
defended one of the sides in the war and that taking such a position was a 
completely natural and expected thing, especially in the situation in 
which reality fundamentally differed from ideas acquired from literary 
models (historical, literary or orally transmitted impressions) that 
prepared foreign observers for the world they were entering. Both 
Maguire and Poggioli speak of the ‘excess of history’, and this phrase 
                                                          
81 The statement of Lieutenant-Colonel Milan Gvero can be found in Ćirić (2005). 
The segment from the news of Serbian television which mentions ‘the burning of 
car tyres’ is available today on Youtube: 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=HPJ3O4ffW3Q (last access 4/3/2016).  
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about ‘excess’ relates to the fact that the picture and ideas acquired 
within the framework of preparing for the task (and they generally 
reproduced the views of the authorities of socialist Yugoslavia on the 
state they administered) were shown to be insufficient for understanding 
the complex reality. Socialist Yugoslavia was not (only) a state that had 
emerged in the anti-Fascist struggle against the Axis powers, and which 
had unexpectedly resisted Stalin and sought its place in the sun within the 
framework of the project of modernizing society as part of the ‘Non-
Aligned Movement’; it was at the same time a (fairly) brutal totalitarian 
dictatorship, founded on an extreme terror that terrified its own subjects 
in the late 1940s, as well as a society marked by deep injustices on both a 
personal and collective level, which was all maintained mainly thanks to 
a diversified and pronounced system of supervision and control. In such 
circumstances the spectre of possible reactions when coming face to face 
with the complex and disorderly reality full of contradictions was fairly 
limited – forced to produce daily news, the journalist did not have the 
opportunity to nuance his views, cautiously weigh all information and 
present it in a faithful account of the context(s). The vast majority 
decided in favour of the least demanding solution – to simplify reality, 
take sides and stick to established parameters with regard to who is 
‘good’ and who is ‘bad’, which automatically meant the loss of the 
position of an ‘uninterested foreign observer’. 
And while such an exit is somewhat understandable for a 
journalistic position, it is presumed that those who dissected the war from 
the position of a scholar were in a much better position with regard to the 
possibility of maintaining a neutral point of observation. Within that 
population of scholars, the greatest interest for the war, in the sense of its 
causes, motives and manner in which it was conducted, was certainly and 
understandably shown by those from the areas of history, 
sociology/political science and anthropology. But it is worth observing 
something else: the causes of the disintegration of Yugoslavia drew the 
attention of a fairly limited circle of scholars, mainly those from the 
Anglo-American and Serbian milieu (with rare exceptions such as 
Sabrina P. Ramet), amongst all of whom, more or less, there is the 
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feeling of a pronounced note of missing everything that that state 
represented.82 On the Croatian side, until the early 1990s the question of 
the causes of the collapse and disintegration of the Yugoslav state did not 
represent an agenda worthy of attention – it seems that on this side the 
disintegration of the state was experienced as a self-explanatory and 
natural thing, and those who express regret in any way represent a 
pronounced minority. Even when scholars connected to the Croatian side 
by origin and socialized in Anglo-American circles have dealt with 
analyses tied to Yugoslavia, the basic questions have been asked from the 
opposite end: not how and why the state disintegrated, but how did that 
state emerge and how did it succeed in maintaining itself at all (such an 
approach in itself says a lot about the general perception of Yugoslavia 
on the Croatian side).83 
Apart from this biased stance very specific marketing tone is 
clearly discernible in the titles of the huge number of texts that emerged 
and were published in the 1990s, which, in this or that way, exploited the 
wartime tragedy of Bosnia-Herzegovina. One of the most obvious and 
ugliest examples of this marketing abuse is the work of the Dutch 
                                                          
82 The literature that emerged in this circle and dedicated to the problem of the 
collapse of the Yugoslav state and the war for Yugoslav succession is enormous and 
it simply does not pay to cite even the titles, but the ‘balance of power’, which has 
been discussed, is clearly visible from the exhaustive review of various viewpoints 
that can be found in Dragović-Soso (2008). 
83 Excellent examples of agendas and the manner of posing questions in scholarly 
analyses on the Croatian side include Banac (1984), and Drapac (2010). For a 
typical Croatian approach to the problem of the disintegration of the state, in which 
one practically only sees Croatian-Serbian relations in the simplified scheme of 
‘Greater Serbian ideology’ which resulted in the ‘armed aggression’ of 1990, see 
the work of Anzulović (1999). Standing completely outside of the matrix of views 
of Croatian scholars with regard to Yugoslavia and its end is the work of Vjekoslav 
Perica (2002), an author who, apart from his origin and the formal position which 
he currently occupies (professor at the Faculty of Philosophy in Rijeka), belongs to 
the Anglo-American and Serbian circle of scholars who are emotionally engaged 
because of the fate of the state that existed for almost seventy years, but what is 
indicative is the absence of any reaction to this work in Croatian scholarly circles. A 
more nuanced picture of the views of Croatian scholars regarding Yugoslavia, 
which would require a separate discussion, would show a more precise arrangement 
of positions, but still within the roughly established framework presented here. 
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anthropologist (and amateur historian) Mart Bax, who, in order to draw 
attention to his work on the saturated bookselling market, located 
Međugorje (a settlement in the centre of Herzegovina) in ‘rural Bosnia’ 
in the very title of his book.84 But, nevertheless, due to his impudent 
inventions and unparalleled constructions, which even the ‘yellow press’ 
would avoid (e.g. the completely invented war between two family clans 
in Međugorje in 1991, which took, no more and no less, than 150 
victims) and the important and crucial contribution of the imagining and 
construction of Ruritania (the name of a fictitious land that exists only as 
a discursive construction, which was introduced into the literature by 
Vesna Goldsworthy),85 Bax deserved a separate and longer review. 
However in the end (in 2013, when he had already entered retirement 
long ago), Bax’s improprieties were addressed by the body of his 
university (Vrie University, Amsterdam), which resulted in the 
elaboration of a study, which was written by his colleagues Michiel 
Baud, Susan Legêne and Peter Pels.86 The authors of this study, however 
reluctantly, nevertheless had to acknowledge that, in writing about 
Bosnia-Herzegovina, Bax invented ‘facts’, cited non-existent sources, 
presented his interpretations as facts and many other such things. In the 
introduction to the study,87 the three authors express their concern for the 
consequences of the extremely dishonourable conduct of their ‘respected 
colleague’ and consider the possible harm of such actions to the entire 
academic community, which I will illustrate here with one practical 
example. Namely, Bax’s entirely invented story about the ‘small war’ 
(with more than 150 people allegedly dead) that was conducted in the 
Catholic centre of pilgrimage, Međugorje, in Herzegovina in 1992, was 
accepted verbatim and with full confidence by Michael Mann, who 
imbedded it as an important argument in his reflections on the 
phenomenon of ‘ethnic cleansing’ in the variant that relates to the former 
                                                          
84 Bax (1995). 
85 Goldsworthy (1998). 
86 Baud, Legêne & Pels (2013). See in English about this academic scandal in Jolić 
2013. 
87 Baud, Legêne & Pels (2013): 4-9. 
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Yugoslavia.88 As his theoretical analysis of the phenomenon of ‘ethnic 
cleansing’ rests on a huge number of practical examples taken from the 
literature, and without real verification (practically impossible because of 
the almost immense number of such small case studies), it is natural to 
ask the question, after the fabrications of Bax have been formally 
verified, as to how many such cases are to be found in the material that 
the author used. Bax’s example is malevolent for the whole academic 
community inasmuch he is a priori granted, as a ‘foreign observer’, full 
confidence because it is assumed that he does not ‘represent’ any side, 
but it has been highlighted that to be an outsider does not automatically 
mean to be impartial, because partiality is possible due to the personal 
benefit of the author himself: the need to say something ‘new’, to achieve 
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Autor razmatra pozadinu čestoga običaja kraćenja naziva 
Bosne i Hercegovine na prvi dio njezina složenog imena - 
Bosnu. Zaključuje da se s jedne strane radi o benignoj 
mentalnoj inerciji, ali da to kraćenje može s druge strane biti 
i iskaz određenih političkih stajališta. Razvijajući tu ideju, 
autor raščlanjuje razvojnu putanju nacionalne integracije 
Bošnjaka-muslimana i upozorava na činjenicu da je tek 
nedavno potpuno oblikovan nacionalistički diskurs i unutar 
njega ‘središnji narativ’ bošnjačko-muslimanske nacionalne 
povijesti. Razlažući značenje, funkcije i razvoj takvoga 
‘središnjeg narativa nacionalne povijesti’, autor upozorava 
kako je već razvijeni srpski narativ bio od krucijalne 
važnosti za brzo ukorjenjivanje zemljopisnoga naziva 
‘Srpska’ za dio Bosne i Hercegovine pod srpskim nadzorom. 
Iz toga onda proizlazi i prepoznavanje povezanosti 
oblikovanja bošnjačko-muslimanskoga ‘središnjeg narativa 
nacionalne povijesti’ s učestalim zahtjevima da se i službeno 
mijenja ime Bosne i Hercegovine u Bosna. Tu evoluciju 
autor pripisuje promjenama u ukupnom društvenom i 
političkom kontekstu, koje su dovele do toga da je 
bošnjačko-muslimanska politička i intelektualna elita 
napustila ‘strategije slabih’ i u svojim zahtjevima postala 
znatno otvorenija i agresivnija no što je bila do početka 
devedesetih godina 20. stoljeća, tražeći da Bosna i 
Hercegovina promjenom imena i na simboličan način 
postane bošnjačko-muslimanska nacionalna država. 
Razmatrajući povijesne korijene zemljopisnoga i političko-
upravnoga naziva Hercegovina, autor pokazuje da on 
pripada otomanskome povijesnome sloju i nema izravne i 
organske veze sa srednjovjekovnim tradicijama Humske 
zemlje, koje su ugasle nakon otomanskoga osvajanja. U 
zaključnim razmatranjima autor pokazuje da je obrana 
punoga naziva Bosne i Hercegovine u hrvatskoj političkoj i 
intelektualnoj eliti zapravo posljedica nesvjesnoga 
prihvaćanja ‘strategije slabih’ i da je dobila simbolično 
značenje očuvanja kakve takve nacionalne ravnopravnosti. 
